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INTRODUCTION 
Government increasingly leverages its regulatory function by embody­
ing in law standards that are promulgated and copyrighted by non­
governmental organizations. Departures from such standards expose citizens 
to criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions, yet private actors generate, 
control, and limit access to them. Despite governmental ambitions, no one is 
responsible for evaluating the legitimacy of this approach ex ante and no 
framework exists to facilitate analysis. This Article contributes an analytical 
framework and proposes institutional mechanisms to implement it. 
The lack of a comprehensive framework for evaluating copyright to 
standards embodied in law is surprising because the range of standards po­
tentially affected is large and growing.' It includes standards relating to 
accounting, consumer product safety, energy, government contracting, in­
surance, medicine, and telecommunications; codes for buildings, 
corporations, and legal ethics; and manuals for stock exchange listings and 
scores of others.2 
To illustrate, it is a violation of federal law for any person to file re­
quired financial statements with the Securities and E xchange Commission 
("SEC") that are not in conformity with generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples ("GAAP")3 or for auditors to attest to such financial statements unless 
audited in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards 
("GAAS"). The SEC has enforced these laws in thousands of administrative 
proceedings and hundreds of federal court cases asserting violations of 
GAAP or GAAS or both.4 Yet these accounting standards are not freely 
available to the public or to prosecuted persons. Instead, they are claimed to 
1. Scholarship addressing standards tends to examine patents covering industry standards, 
with particular attention to technology, not copyright addressed to narrative standards embodied in 
law. E.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 
CAL L. REV. 1 889 (2002); Janice M. Mueller, Patenting Industry Standards, 34 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 897 (2001 ); Mark R. Patterson, Inventions, Industry Standards, and Intellectual Property, 1 7  
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1043 (2002). 
2. See, e.g., National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTA) of 1995, Pub. L. 
No. 1 04-113, § 1 2(d), 1 10 Stat. 775, 783 (1996); cf Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 
92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972). 
3. Federal securities statutes direct the SEC to establish requirements but do not require 
using GAAP. Securities Act of 1933, 1 5  U.S.C.A. § 77s (2004). GAAP are embodied in public law 
by SEC regulation, policy and enforcement actions. See 17 C.F.R. § 21 0. 1 -01 (2005); Certification 
of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8 1 24, Ex­
change Act Release No. 46427, 78 SEC Docket 875 (Aug. 28, 2002). 
4. Penalties include injunctions, disgorgement, fines, resignations, and imprisonment. See 
MARK S. BEASLEY ET AL., FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING: 1987-1997, at 37-39 (1 999). 
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be copyrighted by the so-called "private" standard setters the SEC or Con­
gress anoints to establish them. 
This Article develops a three-part classification scheme to facilitate 
analysis of the copyright eligibility of such works based on how privately 
generated standards are embodied in public law. Otherwise copyright­
eligible works can assume attributes of law potentially ineligible for copy­
right through three routes: by passing reference in legal materials (weak 
form), by incorporation into law after creation (semi-strong form), or by ex 
ante governmental designation of the standard setter as an officially recog­
nized body (strong form). This Article's framework facilitates analysis of all 
private standards embodied in public law; its case study of accounting stan­
dards is especially useful because their complex generation process provides 
illustrations of each class in this scheme. 
Specifically, (a) contemporary auditing standards are generated by a re­
cent congressionally created and publicly funded body (the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board, "PCAOB") (strong form route);5 (b) contempo­
rary accounting principles are generated by a single SEC-recognized and 
publicly funded body (the Financial Accounting Standards Board, "FASB") 
whose standards for three decades have been incorporated by the SEC (semi­
strong form route);6 and (c) auditing and accounting standards were set before 
these bodies were created by a private not-for-profit professional association 
(the American Institute of Certified P ublic Accountants, "AICPA") whose 
standards were given the SEC's imprimatur by reference (weak form route).7 
Generally, under the framework this Article proposes, copyright is 
(a) not recognized in the strong form route; (b) recognized and generally 
continued in the weak form route (subject to qualifying conventions such as 
compulsory licensing and broadened fair use); and ( c) derecognized in the 
semi-strong form route when factors concerning the author, the work, the 
copier, and the governmental relation to each bear features more akin to the 
strong form than to the weak form. For accounting standards, this means 
that PCAOB work cannot be copyrighted; AICPA work retains copyright, 
subject to some qualifying conventions; and most FASB work becomes in­
eligible for copyright. 
These copyright adjustments are necessary to provide requisite access to 
standards. Otherwise, persons seeking access face considerable obstacles. In 
the case of accounting standards, only the most straightforward portions are 
5. PCAOB establishes auditing standards solely for use in audits of public companies (not 
private enterprises, not-for-profit organizations, or governmental entities). 
6. FASB establishes accounting standards for all entities producing financial statements for 
external users other than governmental entities, including public companies, private enterprises and 
not-for-profit organizations. Accounting for governmental entities is set by FASB's sister organiza­
tion the Governmental Accounting Standards Board, GASB (and, for the United States Government, 
by the Federal Financial Accounting Standards Board, FFASB). 
7.  AICPA establishes accounting and auditing standards for use by all entities producing 
audited financial statements for external users, including public companies, private enterprises, not­
for-profit organizations, and governmental entities, though all of these are supplemental to standards 
produced by PCAOB, FASB, GASB, and FFASB. 
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available without charge on the Internet;8 others must be purchased from 
standard setters. Those wishing to copy materials must apply for permission 
and pay fees, which can require numerous inquiries of the standard setters 
and consume months of diligent effort. Copiers must pay or risk lawsuits, 
with nothing to rely upon but notoriously uncertain defenses to copyright 
infringement claims.9 
Neither the laborious and costly processes nor related litigation uncer­
tainty fit professional or legal needs of affected citizens. These systemic 
infirmities also frustrate the work of later generators of standards seeking to 
build upon predecessor works. In  the case of accounting standards, more­
over, none of these burdens is necessary because in 2002 Congress passed 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that provided PCAOB and FASB with funding for 
100% of their respective budgets and stripped AICPA of power to produce 
accounting standards for entities over which the SEC has jurisdiction. IO 
These changes and the importance of accounting standards in governing 
the legal position of millions of persons make examination of their copy­
right status timely. Moreover, given that accounting standards illustrate a 
larger class of standards embodied in law, and that this class grows steadily, 
the analysis is useful to resolve complex public policy trade-offs in the in­
numerable contexts in which privately promulgated standards are embodied 
in public law. 
Two matters of administrative law arise that this Article's framework 
also helps to analyze. First, embodying private standards in public law can 
amount to abdication of lawmaking functions, violating traditional princi­
ples limiting lawmaker power to delegate this function to private parties. 
Delegation risks should be insignificant in the weak form route because em­
bodiment is limited and insignificant in the strong form route because the 
promulgator is a recognized lawmaker. Delegation risks may be consider­
able in the semi-strong form route, however. Second, federal governmental 
agencies may incorporate by reference private standards in public law with­
out following requisite rulemaking procedures or publication requirements, 
likely posing issues in semi-strong form cases but not in weak or strong 
form circumstances. 
8 .  See, e.g., Financial Accounting Standards Board, http://www. fasb.org (last visited May 6, 
2005). 
9. Consider my experience seeking permission from accounting standard setters to copy 
materials in a casebook called Law and Accounting for law school instruction. It took three months 
to obtain permission and cost $3,000. Copyright lawyers advised that my choices were to pay the 
fees or publish anyway and fight any infringement lawsuit by asserting defenses evaluated in this 
Article. Being risk-averse, I paid the fees and skipped the lawsuit; as an academic, I wrote this Arti­
cle. There are likely many persons like me in the former category; I have some company in the 
latter. See Paul B.W. Miller & Paul R. Bahnson, Funding FASB, AccT. TODAY, June 1 7, 2002 
("FASB standards and publications essentially define legal constraints on practice; therefore, they 
are part of the public record and must be readily accessible . . . .  FASB 's practice of selling standards 
is totally anachronistic . . . .  We even had to pay [it] a permission fee to reprint brief excerpts from 
pronouncements in our upcoming book . . . .  " ). 
IO. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 109, 1 16 Stat. 745 (2002) [hereinaf­
ter SOX]. 
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For the federal government, this Article proposes to require the Director of 
the Federal Register to classify standards embodied in law according to this 
Article's three-part framework and to administer related copyright effects. It 
also contemplates that the Director would police impermissible delegation of 
lawmaking functions to private actors and ensure federal government entity 
compliance with publication requirements. The proposed regulatory approach 
to copyright consequences is necessary because of institutional limitations on 
the federal judiciary's competence to provide a comprehensive ex ante frame­
work. Short of the regulatory solution, however, guidance developed in this 
Article should aid courts in resolving disputes. 
l. THREE-PART FRAMEWORK 
Underlying aspects of the problem of copyright to standards embodied in 
law are clear: legal materials are ineligible for copyright. Far less clear are the 
more manifest aspects of the problem: legal doctrine governing copyright to 
such standards is sparse, conflicting, and ad hoc. 
A. Ancient Concepts 
Since Roman times, a central feature of a law-based civilization has been 
public access to legal materials.11 The ancient concepts were adopted early in 
U.S. history when the Supreme Court announced in the classic cases of 
Wheaton v. Peters12 and Banks v. Manchester13 that judicial opinions cannot be 
protected by copyright. A critical rationale is that these opinions bind all citi­
zens and so must be "free for publication to all" (what might somewhat 
simply be called the public domain rationale ).14 A related rationale is that 
judges need no incentives to generate written legal opinions because this pro­
duction function is an essential component of their work assignment (call this 
the incentives rationale ).15 The same rationales apply to legislative enactments, 
making these likewise ineligible for copyright. 16 These principles apply to all 
judicial opinions and statutes constituting law, both federal and state.17 They 
11. See 3 WILL DURANT, STORY OF CIVILIZATION: CAESAR AND CHRIST 31-32 (1944); 
PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 3-4 (1999). 
12. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834). 
13. 128 U.S. 244, 253 ( 1888). 
14. Id. at 253; see Francine Biscardi, The Historical Development of the Law Concerning 
Judicial Report Publication, 85 LAW LIBR. J. 531 (1993). 
15. See County of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179, 194 (2d Cir. 
2001); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 518 (9th Cir. 1997), amended 
by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir.), cen. denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998). 
16. See Nash v. Lathrop, 6 N.E. 559 (Mass. 1886). 
17. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE 365 (2003); DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT§ 5.12[A], at 5-91 (2004); L. Ray Patter­
son & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and 
Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV. 719, 751-58 (1989). 
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encompass regulations and rules of administrative bodies 18 and local govern­
mental entities.19 
In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress furthered these ancient concepts 
by extending relinquishment of claims to copyright for any work of the U.S. 
government.20 Relinquishment does not reach works of other governmental 
entities21 nor does it automatically extend to work that federal agencies 
commission from independent contractors. In the latter context, the Copy­
right Act's legislative history provides guidance to federal agencies. It 
suggests that copyright would be (a) inappropriate when the independent 
contractor produces work the agency could produce itself but (b) appropriate 
when denying it "would be unfair or would hamper the production and pub­
lication of important works."22 The issue is balancing the need for free 
access to the work with the need of the private author to secure a copyright. 
Thus, where government would be incapable of inducing the work's produc­
tion except through copyright protection, copyright may be justified. 23 
B. Modern Standards 
Contemporary production of legal materials relies significantly and in­
creasingly on private-sector standard setters, whose products are embodied 
in law by legislatures, regulators, courts, and other governmental authori­
ties.24 Fitting these standards into the ancient concepts making law ineligible 
for copyright is not as easy as declaring that legislative and judicial pro-
18. See Federal Register Act, 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (2000); Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154 
(1986). 
19. See County of Suffolk,, 261 F.3d at 179. 
20. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000). Section 101 defines "a work of the United States 
Government" as "a work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as 
part of that person's official duties." Id. § 101. The rationale of the government works doctrine is an 
extension of the rationale against copyright in judicial and legislative pronouncements, not that 
allowing copyright in government works would make the public "pay twice" for these works. WIL­
LIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcoNOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW 15 (2003). 
21. See, e.g., County of Suf olk, 261 F.3d at 179; see also Marvin J. Nodiff, Copyrightability 
of Works of the Federal and State Governments Under the 1976 Act, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 91, 104 
(1984). The pending Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act denies copy­
right protection to state and local governmental entities as well as the federal government. H.R. 
3261, 108th Cong.§ 5(a) (2003). 
22. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 59 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5672. The 
legislative history appears to guide federal agencies and Congress, not judicial interpretation of the 
statute. Still, the guidance expresses federal congressional policy, so it should be legitimate for those 
grappling with related policy questions to consider it. See infra note 119. 
23. See County of Suffolk, 261 F.3d at 194. 
24. See, e.g., National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 1 04-
113, 110 Stat. 775 (1996); U.S. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8545, 8555 
(Feb. 19, 1998); see also Standards for Business Practices of Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines, 
FERC Order No. 587-A, 77 FERC 'lI 61061 n.11 (Oct. 21, 1996). American National Standards 
Institute ("ANSI'') boasts that the congressional policy is "having a dramatic impact upon the way 
federal agencies do business in the standardization area." ANSI, Significant Federal Laws and Poli­
cies, http://www.ansi.org/govemment_affairs/laws_policies/laws.aspx?menuid=6 (last visited May 
25, 2005). 
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nouncements are ineligible for copyright. Apart from ambiguity as to 
whether they constitute law in the way legislation and court decisions do, 
neither public domain concerns (of due process and free access) nor inher­
ent incentives of lawmakers to produce law are as obvious. Even the 
somewhat more involved balancing inquiry used to assess suitability of 
copyright to government works prepared by independent contractors does 
not readily resolve such cases. 
A prominent illustration concerns municipalities adopting a privately 
generated building code as law, as in Veeck v. Southern Building Code Con­
gress International, Inc .. 25 The eight-member en bane majority emphasized 
that legislative adoption rendered the code law and this, ipso facto, put it in 
the public domain, ineligible for copyright. The six-member en bane dissent 
(through two separate opinions) stressed the need to consider incentive ef­
fects of such a conclusion on future production of kindred materials. Each 
side recognized the legitimacy of the other's argument: the dissenters ob­
served that the case raised no due process or free access issues (the copier 
was neither charged with nor prosecuted for any violation of law) and the 
majority observed that no incentives were upset because the private standard 
setter in question promulgated standards principally for the purpose of get­
ting them enacted into law. 26 
Dividing the majority and dissents in Veeck was also disagreement as to 
the proper role of intermediate federal appellate courts in resolving such a 
profound issue of public policy (not merely of law, but posing novel legal 
issues in a complex public policy context). Thus, while all the court's judges 
appeared to accept the basic policy stakes as pitting public domain concerns 
against incentive effects on production, they emphasized different aspects of 
these competing policy objectives. 
What makes Veeck a difficult case is that the standards at issue were 
adopted (a) formally rather than in passing and (b) in full long after their 
promulgation. Point (a) made it difficult for the majority to shrug off adop­
tion as one might a passing judicial reference to a professional standard in a 
negligence case; point (b) made it difficult for the dissent to accept the im­
paired incentives entailed by copyright vitiation upon the code's adoption as 
law. This combination of points marks relatively easier cases at each end of 
the spectrum: ( 1) passing reference in legal materials to standards does not 
make standards law with copyright-destroying effects (even Veeck's majority 
makes this clear) and (2) formal ex ante anointment of an organization to 
prepare standards bearing binding legal effects can destroy copyright (even 
Veeck's dissents appear to accept this, certainly when due process issues 
arise). 
A three-part classification scheme thus emerges, as both a descriptive 
and normative matter. The classes within the threefold classification scheme 
25. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'I, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003). Only three other federal appellate cases exist, none adjudicated by the 
Supreme Court. See infra Section LC. 
26. Veeck, 293 F.3d at 805. 
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by which standards become embodied in law may be called for convenience: 
weak form, semi-strong form, and strong form. Descriptively, this frame­
work derives from reconciling judicial opinions in cases like Veeck; 
normatively, it enables capturing the important factors relevant to conduct­
ing requisite public policy balancing inquiries: the author's identity, the 
nature of the work, the identity and nature of the copier, and the relation of 
the governmental entity to the author, work, and copier. Consider some il­
lustrations. 
Standards take the weak form route into law by reference, as when 
courts admit authoritative materials into evidence to evaluate a defendant's 
potential liability. Judicial references to Gray 's Anatomy to help define a 
physician's standard of care do not destroy copyright in that work.27 The 
author and the work are autonomous from any governmental action and the 
governmental use arises in a discrete context. Derecognizing copyright is 
not necessary as a due process matter because the referenced text does not 
formally bind all or a class of citizens ex ante but is used in a particular ju­
dicial evaluation; letting such judicial use vitiate copyright in particular 
works would destroy copyright altogether, eliminating all incentives copy­
right offers. 
This class is as widespread as the legal regime it ultimately but indi­
rectly serves-and is growing in size as more standards are embodied in 
law. Critical to traditional jurisprudential recognition of such references, 
however, is both their authoritative status and their accessibility. As this 
class of standards embodied in law grows, these attributes assume greater 
social significance, requiring more formal assurance that the standards are 
widely available to affected persons. 
The semi-strong form route occurs through adoption when, as in Veeck, 
a legislative body formally enacts a standard as law. As the split court in 
Veeck attests, this context poses considerable difficulties. The author may or 
may not seek to contribute his work to the fabric of law, the work itself may 
or may not assume characteristics of a law-like codification, and the gov­
ernmental interest in it may be expressed by wholesale adoption or cut-and­
paste adaptation. Difficult issues arise from these differences in the exercise 
of balancing free access and due process on the one hand with the incentive 
effects on prospective producers of such standards on the other. This class 
can be sizable, including, for example, the American Bar Association's 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by many state supreme 
courts and promulgations of the Gas Industry Standards Board embodied in 
regulations of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 28 
The strong form route of standards-into-law arises by ordainment, as 
where a governmental authority anoints a designated standard setter to pro-
27. Cf Freshwater v. Scheidt, 7 1 4  N.E.2d 891, 896 n.2 (Ohio 1999) (citations omitted). 
28. See infra note 207; see also Standards for Business Practices of Interstate Natural Gas 
Pipelines, 61 FED. REG. 39,053 (July 1 7, 1996); Standards for B usiness Practices of Interstate Natu­
ral Gas Pipelines, 61 FED. REG. 19,2 1 1 (May 1 ,  1 996); Michael Ariens, The Ethics of Copyrighting 
Ethics Rules, 36 U. ToL. L. REV. 235 (2005). 
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duce materials the authority itself could produce. This is the functional 
equivalent of legislative enactment. In contrast to weak form adoption, this 
is an outright assignment of the task and comprehensive embrace of the 
work to bind all those to whom the legal, regulatory, and standard-setting 
framework speaks; in contrast to semi-strong form adoption, those features 
negate incentive concerns. This class appears likely to have few members at 
present, but could become an increasingly appealing governmental policy 
• 29 option. 
A distinguishing feature of this class of strong form standards-into-law 
is how standards form the corpus of the law governing those addressed. 
They do not merely inform the legal basis for negligence and other trans­
gressions to which passing references (weak form adoption) may be applied, 
but constitute the fabric of that law. As a result, covered persons need 
knowledge of these standards to comply with law, as do lawyers advising 
them. In these respects, such materials are de facto law. The source of this 
distinguishing feature is formal legislative and administrative anointment of 
the body as an official legal standard setter, needing none of the incentives 
that copyright provides. 
These descriptive illustrations can be summarized abstractly. Compo­
nent variables reveal the ultimate policy tension as balancing incentive 
needs with access needs. Conceptually, the framework relates trade-off rela­
tivity as follows: weak form embodiment circumstances are characterized 
by greater incentive needs for producers and lesser access needs for users 
while strong form embodiment circumstances are characterized by lesser 
incentive needs for producers and greater access needs for users (semi­
strong embodiment circumstances are characterized by needs of intermedi­
ate orders). The figure below summarizes. 
29. See infra Section III.A. 
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As to author identity and the nature of a work, private actors producing 
materials for purposes other than embodiment in law epitomize the weak 
form route (non-copyright incentives may be low), while officially anointed 
actors creating standards for embodiment in law epitomize the strong form 
route (non-copyright incentives suffice). As to user identity, persons who are 
members of a class affected by a standard embodied in law signal the strong 
form route (class access is critical), while randomly affected persons associ­
ate with the weak form route (public access is not compelling). The 
governmental relation to each likewise drives towards the strong form route 
when government's role is consciously a lawmaking function and towards 
the weak form route in opposite cases. The generality of this framework can 
be seen initially by reviewing existing judicial doctrine, sparse and ad hoc 
th h . . 30 oug It IS. 
C. Judicial Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has yet to address the copyright consequences of 
privately promulgated standards embodied in public law. Only four federal 
appellate court opinions address the context. Three of these decline to treat 
such embodiment as vitiating copyright-Veeck is the exception and also the 
30. See Maryjane Boone Bonfield, Casenote, Veeck v. SBCCI, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002), 
56 S MU L. REv. 1 025 (2003); Katie M. Colendich, Comment, Who Owns "The Law"? The Effect 
on Copyrights when Privately Authored Works are A dopted or Enacted by Reference into Law, 78 
WASH.  L. REV. 589 (2003); Shubha Ghosh, Copyright as Privatization: The Case of Model Codes, 
78 TuL. L. REv. 653 (2004); Robert Kry, Case Note, The Copyright Law, 1 1 1  YALE L.J. 761 (200 1 ); 
Nick Martini, Note, Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., 1 8  BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 93 (2003). 
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most recent.31 A review suggests basic components of  the doctrinal terrain to 
which more complex elaborations are developed in the rest of this Article. 
The review of judicial doctrine reveals the appeal of this Article's three­
part classification scheme as a descriptive matter, being derivable from the 
cases; the review also supports its normative aspects, being analytically de­
fensible to think through policy trade-offs the cases struggle with. That 
struggle, in tum, illustrates inherent limitations on the judiciary's ability to 
resolve the trade-offs without aid of at least a formal framework such as the 
framework this Article contributes; it also shows need for an administrative 
.mechanism to provide ex ante solutions, which this Article also contributes. 
1. B OCA (1st Circuit 1980/2 
BOCA vacated an author's preliminary injunction against a copier of a 
state-adopted building code as improvidently granted. The author encour­
aged public authorities to adopt its code by reference, provided updates, and 
sold the subject-state's version for $22 per copy (the copier sold its version 
for $35 per copy, though it contained only modest variations compared to 
the official copyrighted code). The novel issue was whether inclusion of the 
copyrighted code in state regulations rendered the materials freely available 
for copying. The copier's chief argument was that such adoption bore the 
force of law, stripping the code of copyright. BOCA thus illustrates what I 
call the semi-strong form route standards take into law. 
The court stopped short of ruling definitely on the point. It framed the 
issue by reference to the absence of copyright in judicial and legislative 
works under Wheaton v. Peters33 and other cases, considering whether the 
code's private authorship made a legal difference compared to such cases. 
Weighing public domain with incentives concerns, the court was "far from 
persuaded" that the author retained copyright and was unable to conclude 
that the rule as to judicial and legislative materials did not apply equally to 
codes adopted as regulation. But it opted to "leave the door slightly ajar with 
respect to [this] issue," saying only that the author's claim was insufficient 
to sustain a preliminary injunction.34 
This reticence was due in part to the issue's novelty and in part due to "a 
possible trend towards state and federal adoption, either by means of incor­
poration by reference or otherwise, of model codes."35 The issue remains 
novel as a matter of law, but the "possible" trend rapidly accelerated. 
3 1 .  For district court opinions, see Harrison Co. v. Code Revision Comm' n, 260 S.E.2d 30, 
34 (Ga. 1 979), and Georgia v. Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp. 1 1 0, 1 14-1 5  (N.D. Ga. 1 982), vacated per 
stipulation, 559 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Ga. 1983). 
32. Bldg. Officials and Code Admin. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730 (I st Cir. 1 980) [here-
inafter BOCA]. 
33. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 59 1 ,  668 ( 1 834). 
34. Id. at 736. 
35. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1 9 1 0, 308-309 (2005), adopting as federal regulation the National 
Electrical Code, a copyrighted code similar to that at issue in BOCA). 
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2. CCC (2d Circuit 1994)36 
CCC reversed a declaratory judgment for a copier against an author. 
Both published information on used car valuations, the author in the so­
called Red Book and the copier in a computer database. The court devoted 
most of its opinion to questions of basic copyright eligibility, including as to 
originality and the contours of copyright eligibility for compilations, turning 
finally and briefly to the copier's public domain defense to infringement. 
This argument rested on establishment in state insurance law of Red Book 
values as an alternative standard to set minimum loss payouts.37 State law's 
passing reference to the Red Book thus illustrates what I call the weak form 
route standards take into law. 
The court found no authority for the copier's view, not even the other­
wise sympathetic BOCA case, stating its unwillingness to decide "that a 
state's reference to a copyrighted work as a legal standard for valuation re­
sults in loss of the copyright."38 While not dismissing the argument's 
credibility, offsetting considerations included its potential as a taking under 
the Constitution39 and its sweeping reach. The court instanced the threat to 
copyright in school textbooks when states require these in mandatory cur­
riculums.40 It noted doctrinal authority for a different balance: expanding fair 
use defenses for personal copiers, but not immunizing commercial copiers 
because this would destroy copyright's goal of promoting creativity amid 
"the increasing trend toward state and federal adoptions of model codes.',41 
Since CCC, this "increasing trend" has become a hardened reality. 
3. Practice Management (9th Circuit 1997/2 
Practice Management affirmed a ruling that the American Medical As­
sociation ("AMA") did not lose its copyright in a medical procedure coding 
system when the system was required by government regulations.43 AMA 
publishes and updates the coding system to classify medical procedures for 
ease of reference. Congress instructed the Health Care Financing Admini­
stration ("HCFA") to establish a uniform code to identify physicians' 
36. CCC Info. Servs. Inc. v. Macl,ean Hunter Mkt. Rep., Inc., 44 F.3d 6 1  (2d Cir. 1 994) 
[hereinafter CCC]. 
37. Id. at 73 n.29 (citing N.J. Admin. Code 1 1 :3- 1 0.4 ( 1 988); 1 1  N.Y. Admin. Code 
§ 2 16.7(c) ( 1 990)). 
38. Id. at 74. 
39. The takings issue is real but likely underwhelming. See infra Section ill.D. 
40. CCC, 44 F.3d at 74. 
4 1 .  Id. at 74, n.30 (quoting NIMMER, supra note 1 7 ,  § 5.06[C] at 5-60). 
42. Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 1 2 1  F.3d 5 1 6  (9th Cir. 1 997), amended 
by 133 F.3d 1 1 40 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952 ( 1 998). 
43. The court found against the AMA on grounds that it misused this copyright in dealing 
with the government. Id. at 5 2 1 .  
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services used in Medicare and Medicaid claim forms.44 Heralding trends in 
the regulatory use of private standards, HCFA contracted with AMA to use 
its coding system rather than reinvent the wheel.45 The contract required 
HCFA to use this system and the regulation required users to do so.46 
The court referenced the law against copyrighting judicial opinions and 
statutes, identifying the dual policy objectives associated with incentives 
versus public domain (access, due process, notice). As to incentives, it stated 
that: "invalidating [AMA's] copyright on the ground that the [coding sys­
tem] entered the public domain when HCFA required its use would expose 
copyrights on a wide range of privately authored model codes, standards, 
and reference works to invalidation" -including the Bluebook guide to legal 
citations.47 As to public domain, the court found "no evidence that anyone 
wishing to use the [coding system] has any difficulty obtaining access to it" 
and "no realistic threat to public access."48 
The court identified qualifying conventions to combat access restrictions 
that private standard setters such as AMA might impose. These include: 
( 1) regulatory agencies could terminate agreements or adopt regulations 
requiring standard setters to expand access;49  (2) courts could enlarge copy­
right infringement defenses such as fair use and due process; and 
(3) legislators could adopt compulsory licensing arrangements.50 The Ninth 
Circuit in Practice Management thus joined the Second Circuit in CCC to 
sustain private copyrights when standards are embodied in law following 
what I call the weak form route-with the First Circuit in BOCA deferring 
judgment when private standards were embodied in law using what I call the 
semi-strong form route. 
4. Veeck (5th Circuit 2002/1 
The Fifth Circuit's initial panel decision in Veeck joined the Second and 
Ninth Circuits in these conclusions but, upon rehearing en bane, blazed a 
different trail that closed the door left ajar by the First Circuit in BOCA. All 
agreed on the facts: Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc. 
("SBCCI") is a not-for-profit membership association that writes building 
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1 395w-4(c)(5) (2000). 
45. Practice Mgmt., 1 2 1  F.3d at 5 18. 
46. The court found the former to be misuse of copyright. Id. at 5 2 1 .  Practice Management 
illustrates difficulties that can arise when classifying adoptions. The HCFA-AMA contract suggests 
more than mere passing reference, signaling semi-strong form embodiment. But the court's treat­
ment of its terms as misuse of copyright vitiated copyright protection and thus the contract, 
justifying classification as weak form embodiment. 
47. Id. at 5 1 9. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1 476, at 59, reprinted in 1 976 U.S.C.C.A.N. §§ 5659, 
5672). 
50. Id. 
5 1 .  Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'!, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003) .  
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codes; two small Texas towns enacted the 1994 edition of SBCCI's Stan­
dard Building Code into law; and an individual published the enacted code 
on a website (having paid for a copy but despite an accompanying licensing 
agreement prohibiting such publication). 
The Veeck majority emphasized Banks v. Manchester's public domain 
rationale, rejecting arguments that the opinion rested entirely on the ration­
ale that judges (and legislators) are paid to produce laws.52 When embodied 
in law, the code lost copyright eligibility for another doctrinal reason: this 
rendered the code a "fact" or "idea" incapable of expression in any way ex­
cept as embodied and copyright never protects facts or ideas.53 The majority 
also distinguished CCC and Practice Management that upheld continuing 
copyright in codes or standards when official legal materials make mere 
passing references to them (what I call the weak form route).54 
As a matter of policy and incentives, the Veeck majority noted that, char­
acteristic of such weak form adoption cases, authors produced work for 
purposes other than enactment as law, whereas SBCCI's purpose was to get 
its codes enacted as law.55 The majority discounted arguments that de­
copyrighting privately produced standards when formally embodied in law 
would so reduce producer revenues as to destroy incentives for production.56 
The majority emphasized that industry experts have inherent incentives to 
produce industry codes, copyright or not, finding it difficult to imagine cir­
cumstances where greater inherent incentives exist (what I call the strong 
form route illustrates what the court found difficult to imagine).57 
Judge Higginbotham's brief dissent, which described Veeck as a "diffi­
cult case," resisted deciding it under the refrain that "the law" belongs to the 
people, emphasizing lack of institutional knowledge within federal appellate 
courts concerning related incentive effects. It distinguished Banks as "about 
the acquiring of copyrights by public officials, not .. . invalidating the copy­
rights held by private actors when their work is licensed by lawmakers."58 
The challenge is to balance competing and abstract public policies, gener­
ally better suited for Congress than courts, but on the Veeck facts the balance 
tipped toward SBCCI since: (a) the towns received a benefit and (b) holding 
for the copier would invalidate copyright on all published codes ever 
adopted by any governmental body.59 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 800--01 (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.  Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)). 
The Veeck majority wove together its analysis of how embodiment of the code in law rendered the 
result a "fact" and/or an "idea." See infra Section l.D. 
5 4. Veeck, 293 F.3d at 804-05. 
55. Id. at 805. 
56. Id. at 805 n.2 1 .  
57. See id. at 806. 
58. Id. at 806-07 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). 
59. Id. Judge Higginbotham's conclusion that the majority's ruling vitiates copyright in  
codes embodied in law likely is correct. See infra text accompanying notes 253-254. 
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Judge Wiener elaborated a blistering dissent, calling the majority's opin­
ion "drastic" and "ill-suited for modem realities,"60 not a result that federal 
courts are justified in reaching. First, Judge Wiener accepted the facts as 
undisputed, but underscored: (a) the code's embodiment in law was through 
"incorporation by reference," (b) the work was original, ( c) the code was 
readily available for purchase, and (d) the copier adopted the work whole­
sale without identifying its author. 61 Second, Judge Wiener criticized the 
majority opinion's approach as providing no respectable analytical frame­
work because it ignores: the nature of the author, the character of the work, 
the relationship of the copier to the work and of the copier to the govern­
mental enactor, and the nature of the copier (that is, whether the copier 
needs to know the work/law's contents). 
Judge Wiener also emphasized that Veeck is "not a free access case"62 
and that no precedent exists, treating Banks as based on judicial compensa­
tion preventing judges from copyrighting their opinions (and similarly for 
legislators)63 and noting the CCC court's decision to continue copyright pro­
tection in private standards embodied in public law (through what I call the 
weak form route).64 As a result, the case presented "a wide-open and unre­
solved question of copyright law" that should await resolution by Congress 
or the Supreme Court because it is entirely a matter of public policy.65 The 
majority filled the blankness of this policy slate chiefly by treating the code 
as a "fact" or "idea" once embodied in law; Judge Wiener regarded this 
treatment as simply a legal conclusion derived from policy determinations, 
not an independent analytical tool.66 
Judge Wiener charged that the majority's rhetoric of citizen ownership 
of law is uncritical, naive, "simplistic," and "grandiloquent."67 It fails to ex­
plore "distinctions between different types of enactments and the policy 
considerations attendant on each."68 Codes differ from judicial opinions or 
statutes as to author, work, copier, and the governmental relation to each. 
Thus, privately produced codes are: not funded from the "public fisc," usu­
ally specialized requiring technical expertise, applicable to narrow classes of 
60. Veeck, 293 F.3d at 809-10 (Wiener, J., dissenting). 
6 1 .  Id. at 808--09. 
62. Id. at 8 1 0. Judge Wiener acknowledged that, if standards embodied in law were not 
freely accessible to the public, "any defendant prosecuted for violating [them] would surely prevail 
on a due process defense." Id. at 8 1 3  n . 1 3. 
63. Id. at 8 1 1 ,  8 1 3  n . 15 ;  see also County of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 
F.3d 1 79, 1 93 (2d Cir. 200 1 ). 
64. Id. at 8 1 1 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (citing CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. 
Rep., 44 F.3d 6 1 ,  73-74 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
65. Id. at 8 12 & n . 12  (citing Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 ( 1 888); CCC, 44 F.3d 
at 68). 
66. Id. at 8 1 8-20. Judge Wiener responded fully to the majority's conclusion that embodi­
ment rendered the codes "ideas" but did not grapple with the conclusion that such embodiment 
rendered the codes "facts." See infra Section l.D. 
67. Veeck, 293 F.3d at 8 1 4  (Wiener, J., dissenting). 
68. Id. 
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persons not the public at large, and favored as a matter of congressional pol­
icy.69 Judge Wiener noted that other federal courts recognize such 
distinctions, instancing Practice Management and CCC.70 
The majority's holding reduces production incentives, Judge Wiener be­
lieved, as SBCCI relies on revenues from code sales to fund operations ($3 
million of its $9 million in revenues are from sales).71 Other federal courts 
recognize this incentives component of the balancing exercise, again citing 
Practice Management.72 When vitiating copyright causes revenue reduction, 
incentives diminish "absent some alternative source of funds."73 Providing 
funding from sales (as opposed to member dues or contributions) keeps 
standard setters independent from parochial influence.74 Governments bene­
fit from works that such incentives create, given that otherwise they must 
produce materials themselves, which may (a) be infeasible for lack of exper­
tise and (b) produce non-uniformity across jurisdictions.75 Judge Wiener also 
noted other ways to maintain public access without impairing incentives, 
including through doctrines of fair use, implied license, or waiver.76 
5. County of Suffolk (Variation/1 
Judge Wiener's dissent in Veeck drew, in part, on County of Suffolk, a 
case varying the theme of Veeck and its predecessors in that a governmental 
entity created a copyrighted work rather than embody one created by an­
other. As required by state law, the county created tax maps reflecting 
ownership, size, and location of real property in the county's subdivisions. 
The court vacated an order dismissing the county's complaint that a third 
party infringed the county's copyright. 
The public domain issue, while novel, centered on the same question 
Veeck and its predecessors turned on: whether tax maps are analogous to 
statutes and judicial opinions. The court announced an approach familiar to 
readers of the foregoing case summaries. Two factors influence whether a 
work is in the public domain: (1) the author's need for economic incentives 
to create the work and (2) the public's need for notice of the work to have 
notice of law. Neither factor supported public domain in County of Suffolk, 
because (1) even governmental authors may require incentives and (2) the 
69. Id. 
70. See id. at 8 1 5  n.23 (Wiener, J., dissenting). 
7 1 .  Id. at 8 1 6 n.24. 
72. Id. at 8 1 6  n.25. 
73. Id. at 8 16-17 .  The alternative source of funds is a key point amplified in the case study 
of accounting standards, infra text accompanying notes 1 7 1-174. 
74. Veeck, 293 F.3d at 8 17 .  
7 5 .  Id. 
76. Judge Wiener found that none of those existed in Veeck, without acknowledging any 
tension. Id. at 824-25 (Wiener, J., dissenting). 
77. County of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179, 1 94 (2d Cir. 2001 ). 
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tax maps created no legal obligations and in any event access to them was 
not restricted. 
County of Suffolk thus appears to be an easy case. I ts framework follows 
CCC and Practice Management, also relatively easy cases in that they dem­
onstrate the weak form route standards take into law (as the Veeck majority 
acknowledged). BOCA and Veeck are more complex, exhibiting the semi­
strong form route that standards take into law. While Judge Wiener's Veeck 
dissent more completely investigates competing public policy trade-offs, the 
Veeck majority's conclusion is more likely on the right track, as was the 
BOCA court's judicious reluctance to resolve the issue upon a preliminary 
injunction motion. 
As an institutional matter, however, Judge Higginbotham's brief dissent 
in Veeck most resonates in expressing the federal judiciary's inherent limita­
tions in addressing such a sprawling public policy issue. Cases and 
controversies federal courts resolve are not suitable forums to provide opti­
mal solutions to the problems of private standards embodied in public law. 
Such a framework must be provided by a more elaborate policy-oriented 
process. Absent some process (prescribed in Part I I I ), federal courts may be 
aided by the analytical framework this Article contributes. Application will 
be enriched by appreciating that copyright is not absolute but provides a 
protective scope varying with context. 
D. Protective Scope 
The varying scope of copyright protection is conventionally imagined as 
a continuum from thin to thick.78 Core doctrines pivot around this concep­
tion. As discussed below, these doctrines are principally ( 1) copyright 
ineligibility for ideas and facts (dubbed the "idea-expression dichotomy" 
and the related "merger doctrine")79 and (2) "fair use," overcoming copy­
right when certain factors concerning the nature of the work, copying, and 
market justify permitting copying freely. 80 
The idea-expression dichotomy holds that expressions of ideas are eligi­
ble for copyright but that ideas are not (analogous but independent analysis 
applies to distinguish facts from their expression). The difference between 
expressions and ideas is difficult to draw abstractly.81 The difficulty of sus­
taining the idea-expression distinction manifests in copyright's merger 
78. E.g. , Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel .  Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 ( 199 1 ); Fleener v. Trinity 
Broad. Network, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1 142, 1 149 (C.D. Cal. 200 1 ); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS 
AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 
1 1 5- 1 6  (2001);  Sonia K. Katya!, Ending the Revolution, 80 Tux. L. REv. 1 465, 1485 (2002) (book 
review). 
79. E.g. , Copyright Act, 1 7  U.S.C. § 1 02(b) (2000); Feist Publ 'ns, 499 U.S. at 350; Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547-48 (1 985). 
80. E.g. , 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 5 10 U.S. 569 
( 1994). 
8 1 .  See Baker v. Selden, 10 1  U.S. 99 ( 1879); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 
1 1 9, 1 2 1  (2d Cir. 1 930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 ( 193 1 ). 
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doctrine. It holds that the idea-expression distinction vanishes when there is 
only one way (or are few ways) an idea can be expressed. Sustaining the 
idea-expression distinction becomes so tenuous that the concepts merge and 
become essentially the same thing.82 When the distinction between an idea 
and its expression vanishes, copyright functionally treats the result as an 
idea, not an expression, rendering it ineligible for copyright. 
While the idea-expression distinction and merger doctrine provoke rea­
sonable classification disputes for particular examples, 83 difficulties 
essentially disappear once any otherwise contestable idea/expression is em­
bodied in law.84 E ven if an idea can be expressed in numerous ways, when a 
governmental entity prescribes that a particular expression of that idea is the 
one to be followed under penalty of law, then there becomes only one way 
to express that (legal) idea: the one found in the text embodied in law. Copy­
right law does not recognize any property interest in the idea. Put in a 
kindred doctrinal box: facts are not eligible for copyright protection and 
standards embodied in law are facts. 
The fair use doctrine further restricts copyright's protective scope based 
upon numerous factors.85 A key factor is the nature of the work. Copying is 
substantially restricted as to works of fiction compared to a relatively more 
expansive fair use zone as to works of fact. Standards reside on the fact end 
of this continuum. When embodied in law, standards move to the extreme 
end of the continuum as facts (indeed, standards embodied in law may be 
the ultimate facts in copyright terms). 
A second factor is the purpose of copying. The least attractive copiers 
are those who pass off another's work as their own; also unattractive are 
copiers selling another's work at cut-rate prices, having avoided associated 
preparation costs. Such activities with respect to standards promulgated by 
others remain unattractive; many standards, however, are commonly used to 
train persons responsible for related administration and to enable compli­
ance--creating a need for the most attractive copiers.86 
A third fair use factor concerns the effect of a copying upon the market for 
a work. Public policy envisions an active marketplace for the expression of 
ideas that will generate for society maximal idea production. In the market, 
ideas battle for supremacy through competitive expression. This competition 
is desirable across a wide spectrum, from the best way to account for mergers 
82. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 ( 1 st Cir. 1967). 
83. Reasonableness of disagreement justifies Judge Wiener's statement in Veeck that the 
idea-expression distinction and merger doctrine are end points of a legal analysis involving balanc­
ing competing policy goals, not independent analytical tools. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'I, 
Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en bane), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003), (Wiener, J., dissent­
ing); see also Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35 CONN. L. 
REV. 439, 501 n.25 1 (2003). 
84. This disappearance justifies the Veeck majority's conclusion that, once embodied in law, 
codes become "ideas" and/or "facts" ineligible for copyright. Veeck, 293 F.3d at 800-0 I ;  see also 
Karjala, supra note 83. 
85. E.g. ,  Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1 07 (2000). 
86. Cf Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 9 1 3  (2d Cir. 1994). 
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to the best cake recipe.87 How far this market vision should extend is uncer­
tain. 
Many standard setters compete solely for the prize of having their stan­
dards embodied in law. The market metaphor's appropriate extent becomes 
more certain in the case of governmental embodiment of a standard: the race 
is over and that expression of an idea won. Competition shifts from racing 
for best ideas and expressions to disseminating the idea most cheaply. Mo­
nopoly pricing that copyright affords would constitute a social defeat in this 
leg of the competition. 
Although Veeck and its predecessors did not fully develop or deploy 
these doctrinal tools in this way, scholars and courts in other copyright dis­
putes do so to determine the appropriate scope of copyright protection in 
given cases.88 This account of copyright's protective scope, and the doctrinal 
summary preceding it, show both the uses of such techniques to resolve dis­
putes and their limits. Copyright's protective scope is thin for standards, but 
it does exist. 
While this presentation can thus sharpen understanding of the legal 
landscape for future federal courts resolving disputes,89 it remains a bundle 
of ex post solutions in circumstances crying out for ex ante guidance that the 
judiciary appears institutionally incapable of providing.90 Moreover, doc­
trines of greatest utility, particularly compulsory licensing arrangements and 
regulations mandating access, are outside a federal court's competence to 
establish.91 
Apart from institutional limitations on the federal judiciary's policymak­
ing ability, also missing from the contributions of the relevant cases and 
doctrines defining copyright's protective scope are theoretical perspectives 
on the context of producing standards destined for embodiment in law. 
These theoretical perspectives can be gleaned by considering the philoso­
phical basis of U.S. copyright law. 
E.  Utilitarian Theory 
A comprehensive theory of copyright law is not necessary to develop the 
framework and analysis in this Article, but three key features of such a theory 
87. See Malla Pollack, Note, Intellectual Property Protection for the Creative Chef, or How 
to Copyright a Cake: A Modest Proposal, 1 2  CARDOZO L. REV. 1477 ( 1991 ). 
88. See Veeck, 293 F.3d at 8 17 .  A fourth fair use factor addresses the portion of a copying 
compared to a work as a whole. This factor presents questions of policy relating to rights to prevent 
derivative works, discussed infra Section I.E. 
89. These doctrinal analyses are also valuable in understanding that while government em­
bodiment of privately promulgated standards in law may constitute a taking, the property interest 
taken may be slight. See infra Section IIl.D. 
90. A few cases resolved in a similar way applying a similar framework could do the trick. 
Judging by the divided court in Veeck and differing analyses appearing in BOCA, CCC, and Practice 
Management, it is risky to rely upon such an approach. 
9 1 .  Copyright lawmaking is increasingly produced administratively and legislatively rather 
than judicially. See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REv. 87 (2004). 
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bear expressing. First, while some strands of a natural-rights basis for en­
dowing a work's creator with associated rights to control making and 
distributing copies exist,92 the dominant rationale for copyright in the United 
States is utilitarian. For example, the Constitution grants Congress power to 
enact copyright laws to "promote the Progress of Science"-that is, learning 
and knowledge.93 Creating incentives to produce, rather than rewarding pro­
duction, is the overarching objective and philosophical basis of U.S . . h l 94 copyng t aw. 
Copyright law struggles to balance providing incentives to produce with 
the more important objective of dissemination of ideas.95 Copyright's ambi­
tion, then, is to achieve public, not private, benefits.96 While this conception 
is not beyond dispute, its contours favoring the public interest are particu­
larly poignant in the context of standards embodied in law. Along with the 
location of standards embodied in law at the thin edge of copyright's protec­
tive scope, this conception means that, in close cases, copyright law should 
err on the side of concluding that such standards have become law, entered 
the public domain, and lost copyright eligibility. I t  is on these grounds that 
one may support the Veeck majority's conclusions even while appreciating 
the more complete analysis provided in Judge Wiener's dissent. 
Second, the foregoing doctrinal discussions illustrate a recurring theme 
in copyright law: competing public policies must invariably be balanced. A 
common component of such weighting exercises, likewise visible in the 
foregoing discussions, concerns incentives copyright creates for production. 
This incentive function has a long history in copyright theory and law. I t  is 
debated because, in part, emerging evidence suggests that incentives sup­
plied by copyright are less necessary than once thought to generate 
production of copyright-eligible materials.97 While this debate may influence 
copyright's contours, incentive effects play a critical role in prevailing copy­
right law. They figure prominently as an analytical matter in the standards­
embodied-in-law inquiry conducted in this Article. 
For standard setters, however, incentives must be tailored to prevent 
over-production. Unlike commercial producers for whom excessive incen­
tives causing over-production can be dismissed by the marketplace by 
92. E. g., Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary 
France and America, 64 TuL. L. REV. 991 ( 1 990); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual 
Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 350-53 ( 1 988); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as 
Labor and Possession, 5 1  Omo ST. L.J. 5 1 7  ( 1 990). 
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; STEPHEN BREYER, ECONOMIC REASONING AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW: AEl-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER 2003 DISTINGUISHED LECTURE PRESENTED AT THE 
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE DECEMBER 4, 2003, at 13 (AEl-Brookings Joint Ctr. For Reg. 
Studies ed., 2004 ). 
94. See, e. g., Wheaton v. Peters 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 ,  644 ( 1 834). 
95. See Twentielh Cencury Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 1 5 1 ,  1 56 ( 1975). 
96. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 4 1 7, 429 ( 1984 ). 
97. E.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 20, at 4 1-50; Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property, 
Innovation, and Social Progress: The Case Against Incentive Based Arguments, 26 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 601 ,  6 1 9  (2003). 
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ignoring a product, over-production of standards requiring access and com­
pliance can produce significant social costs. Quality is a more important 
feature of standard setting than is quantity. In the case of accounting stan­
dards, for example, evidence indicates that there has been over-production 
in quantity and under-production in quality.98 This consequence may not be 
due to the standard setter's assertion of copyright and consequent royalties 
and licensing fees. But it does not support a case that copyright-and-sales 
arrangements governing standards produce desirable much less optimal 
qualitative attributes. 
The third key feature of copyright theory especially relevant to standards 
concerns incremental improvement in works. Co�yright law vests rights to 
create derivative works in authors of the original. 9 In this protection, copy­
right's utilitarianism cuts two ways. Copyright protection may provide 
incentives in a present author to create a work, but protection also destroys 
incentives for future authors to create derivative works that incrementally 
improve prior work. 
These competing cuts drive through copyright's normative center, yield­
ing contentious debates that invoke such powerful concepts as First 
Amendment free speech rights to challenge protection of derivative works.100 
That William Shakespeare incrementally improved numerous previously 
published plays-not possible when copyright protects against derivative 
works-is a dramatic exhibit supporting free rights to create derivative 
works.101 
For standards, the cut should probably be against copyright protection 
giving standard setters absolute control over derivative works and in favor of 
allowing third parties to provide incremental improvement through derivative 
works. This cut favors copyright's spirit of promoting the public good, of 
maximal idea production through competition for expression supremacy. De­
termining an appropriate balance may vary with relative complexity of a 
particular standard and the importance of keeping it up to date. Those not re­
quiring much improvement warrant thicker derivative rights protection; those 
susceptible to improvement warrant thinner protection and freer third-party 
98. Accountants refer to over-production measured by standards quantity as standards­
overload. See, e.g . ,  The FASB Addresses Standards Overload through New Projects, THE FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD REPORT, Feb. 28, 2002, at 5; Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Ac­
counting: Where Internet Meets Geography, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 261 ,  294 (2000). Under-production 
measured by standards quality is manifest in criticism that accounting standards are too dense and 
rule-bound and insufficiently principles-based. See, e.g. , William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes­
Oxley and Accounting Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1 023 (2003); Freder­
ick Gill, Standards-Based Accounting Principles, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 967 (2003); 
Matthew A. Melone, United States Accounting Standards-Rules or Principles? The Devil ls Not in 
the Details, 58 u. MIAMI L. REV. 1 1 61 (2004). 
99. Copyright Act, 1 7  U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000); see Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright, Derivative 
Works and Fixation: ls Galoob a Mirage, or Does the Form (Gen) of the Alleged Derivative Work 
Matter?, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 991 ,  101 8-20 (2004). 
1 00. E.g. , Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech 
and How Copying Serves It, 1 14 YALE L.J. 535, 55 1-56 (2004). 
I O I .  Pun recognized. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 20, at 66--70. 
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ability to make improvements this way. These issues pervade copyright law, 
and apply to all standards, whether or not embodied in law. 
For standards embodied in law, if incremental improvement by deriva­
tive works were the sole factor, one might conclude that embodiment entails 
relinquishment of this component of copyright protection. All standards em­
bodied in law would be subject to improvement through free rights to 
derivative creation. Yet just as other factors influence the degree to which 
standards embodied in law should be subject to free copying, they prevent 
such an easy solution to determining the extent of derivative rights. This 
Article's three-part framework again helps to focus normative attention. 
Strong form adoption signals high juridical stakes in standards quality, im­
plying greater need for freer third-party rights to create derivative works; 
weak form signals the opposite end of the spectrum; and semi-strong form 
circumstances reside in between. 
II. CASE STUDY 
The history of accounting standard setting in the United States shows 
numerous different bodies participating in an endless process of establishing 
and evolving generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP ") and gen­
erally accepted auditing standards ("GAAS "). Unlike in most countries, 
where accounting standards are produced by legislative bodies, in the 
United States private organizations produce them.102 Nevertheless, they bind 
citizens, just as laws do, meaning they must be accessible to such persons 
and professional advisors. Successive generations of standard setters must 
likewise have access to-and may need ability to build upon­
promulgations of predecessors. 
Until 2002, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
("AICPA") and its predecessors, not-for-profit professional associations of 
accountants, promulgated GAAS. AICPA substantially codified its standards 
in 2002. io3 These are comprised of about 1 00 Statements on Auditing Stan­
dards prescribing methods of performing financial statement audits, as well 
as pronouncements governing quality controls, ethics, independence and 
other matters.104 AICPA asserts copyright over all these materials. io5 
1 02. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Semiotics, Hermeneutics, and Cash: An Essay on the 
True and Fair View, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 893 (2003). Globalization pressures countries 
away from the traditional legislative approach of enacting accounting standards towards using un­
elected private bodies. See id. at 92 1-22. 
1 03. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement of Auditing 
Standards No. 95, § 150 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2002). 
1 04. E.g., CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Code of Profes­
sional Conduct §§ IOI, 1 02, 1 9 1  (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2002); CODIFICATION OF 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statements on Quality Control Standards §§ 20-40 
(Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2002). 
1 05. A few additional independence principles forming part of GAAS were produced by the 
short-lived Independence Standards B oard. INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS Nos. 1-3 (Independence 
Standards Bd. 1 998-2000). The SEC also directly establishes certain GAAS components, princi­
pally concerning independence. See Reg. S-X, 1 7  C.F.R. § 2 10.2-01 (2004). 
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In 2002, Congress ousted AICPA from this role, creating instead a Pub­
lic Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB").106 PCAOB is 
nominally a private not-for-profit corporation, though it has characteristics 
of an instrumentality of the federal government relevant to questions of due 
process.io7 It is funded by fees Congress levies on public companies and 
their auditors. ios PCAOB began its mission by adopting a substantial body of 
GAAS promulgated by AICPA.109 PCAOB did not assert copyright over 
these materials and has produced few of its own worth copyrighting, but 
asserts copyright over the contents of its website and its annual reports. 
Until 1973, promulgation of GAAP was dominated by bodies designated 
by AICPA.110 Many of these works remain integral to GAAP, as do various 
supplemental publications AICPA has produced since 1973 that build on 
earlier materials by interpretation or elaboration. AICPA always has asserted 
copyright over these works, which span thousands of pages of text almost 
certainly meeting basic requirements for copyright eligibility. 
Since 1973, production of GAAP has been dominated by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"). The SEC formally recognizes 
FASB as an authoritative standard setter.111 FASB 's primary promulgations 
are Statements of Financial Accounting Standards, plus numerous supple­
mental materials aggregating some ten-thousand pages of copyright­
qualifying text, over all of which FASB asserts copyright.1 1 2  
S o  who owns copyrights t o  accounting standards, PCAOB, AICPA, 
FASB, or no one? This Part's case study of accounting standards animates a 
framework designed to facilitate analysis of such questions. The framework 
delineates two examples at the extremes: PCAOB illustrates the strong form 
route standards take into law (its standards are never eligible for copyright 
in this framework) and AICPA illustrates the weak form route standards take 
into law (its standards may retain copyright, subject to qualifying conventions 
1 06. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 1 07-204, § I O I ,  1 1 6 Stat. 750 (codified at 1 5  
U.S.C. § 72 1 1  ) .  AI CPA continues to establish auditing standards for audits o f  non-SEC entities. 
1 07. See infra text accompanying notes 1 13-1 1 8. 
1 08. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 109. 
1 09. PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, Interim Auditing Standards, Rule 3200T (Pub. Co. Acct. 
Oversight Bd. 2003 ). 
1 10. These were: the Committee on Accounting Procedure ( 1938-59 which published A c­
counting Research Bulletins, including a codification of extant standards in 1953), see 
RESTATEMENT AND REVISION OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETINS, Accounting Research Bulle­
tin No.43 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants: Comm. On Accounting Procedure 1953), and 
the Accounting Principles Board ( 1 962-73), which published OPINIONS, see, e.g., INTERPRETATIVE 
OPINIONS Nos. 1-3 1 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants: Accounting Principles Bd. 1 962-73). 
1 1 1 . See Commission Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Desig­
nated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Securities Act Release No. 822 1 ,  Exchange Act Release No. 
47743, 80 SEC Docket 1 39 (Apr. 25, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Policy Statement Reaffirming FASB 
Status]; Accounting Series Release No. 150, 3 SEC Docket 275 ( 1 973) [hereinafter SEC, ASR No. 
1 50]. 
1 1 2. FASB produces voluminous secondary and tertiary guidance addressing subjects that are 
more complex, novel, or specialized than those that primary materials address, making access to 
them less pressing in general but more critical for those affected by particular issues. 
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protecting access while preserving incentives). FASB illustrates the semi­
strong route standards take into law. This poses the greatest difficulties, but 
these are eased by evaluation of the other examples. Application suggests 
that most, but not all, FASB promulgations are ineligible for copyright. 
A. Strong Form: PCAOB 
The easiest illustration of the strong form route that standards take into 
law is when a governmental agency develops standards and adopts them as 
regulation-a widespread practice in federal government.113 Nearly as easy 
to classify are standards that PCAOB produces. Despite congressional prot­
estations, PCAOB appears to be part of the U.S. government; even if it were 
not, its congressional mandate and funding system negate rationales for 
copyright in its standards. 
1. Government Works 
When Congress created PCAOB in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
("SOX"), it announced that PCAOB "shall not be an agency or establish­
ment of the United States [g]overnment."11 4 Congressional characterizations 
of instrumentalities it creates are not definitive, at least as to constitutional 
matters.115 Notwithstanding this characterization, PCAOB 's characteristics 
more likely make it a branch of the U.S. government, at least for due proc­
ess purposes. 11 6 It is authorized to make and enforce law, is overseen by the 
SEC in every particular from board identity to approval of standards, and 
properly follows processes characteristic of federal lawmaking bodies.1 1 7  If 
these characteristics render PCAOB a part of the U.S. government, then its 
1 1 3.  See infra Section Ill.A (noting federal government repository boasting some 3 million 
items). 
1 14. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 1 07-204, § l O l (b), 1 16 Stat. 750 (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 721 1). SOX also states that "No member or person employed by, or agent for, [PCAOB] 
shall be deemed to be an officer or employee of or agent for the Federal Government by reason of 
such service." Id. 
1 1 5.  See, e.g., Lebron v. Nat'! R.R. Passenger Corp., 5 1 3  U.S. 374 (1995). While Congress 
might properly declare Amtrak not a government agency for purposes of such congressionally con­
trolled matters as jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act or sovereign immunity, "it is 
not for Congress to make the final determination of Amtrak's status as a [g]overnment entity for 
purposes of determining the constitutional rights of citizens affected by its actions." Id. at 375. 
1 1 6. See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its 
Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 975 (2005). 
1 1 7. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l (2002); Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
§ 1 05(c)(4); INVESTIGATIONS AND ADJUDICATIONS, Rules 5 1 00- 13,  5200-06, 5300-04, 5400-69 
(Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd. 2004). PCAOB promulgations require SEC approval and the SEC 
generally is required to publish any proposed PCAOB rule for public comment before it decides to 
approve the rule or to institute disapproval proceedings. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 107(b)(4). 
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works are ineligible for copyright under the government works doctrine of 
the Copyright Act and as a matter of due process.118 
2. Independent Contractor 
PCAOB's exact juridical status may be uncertain. PCAOB's putative 
lawmaking function is a compelling reason to consider it part of the U.S. 
government. If it were not part of that government, then its purported law­
making and enforcement roles risk running afoul of limitations on lawmaker 
delegation of lawmaking functions to private actors.1 19 This limitation would 
be checked, in part, by rules that require the SEC to approve all PCAOB 
promulgations before they become effective.120 
But suppose PCAOB is neither part of the U.S. government nor an agent 
thereof. It may be viewed as an independent contractor, preparing works for 
the U.S. government that the government could prepare itself. While it is 
possible for independent contractors of the federal government who produce 
works to hold related copyright, this conclusion is not automatic. 
Congressional policy guides agencies in using independent contractors 
to perform such work, balancing not only the need for access with the need 
for incentives, but also inquiring into whether the agency could produce the 
work itself.121 There is no question that the SEC could promulgate auditing 
standards itself. In fact, it does so routinely in a body of auditing regulations 
that supplement or complement GAAS promulgated by PCAOB or AICPA. 
Examples include the SEC's independence requirements for auditors.122 
Consider an illustration of SEC promulgation of auditing standards de­
spite private-sector efforts to do so. In the late 1990s, the Independence 
Standards Board ("ISB"), a private body led by AICPA-member firms and 
private professionals, pursued promulgating auditor independence stan­
dards.123 The SEC participated as an observer in its process for three years, 
before deciding it did not like ISB 's proposals. So it effectively shut ISB 
1 1 8. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000); supra Section I.A; see also Veeck v. S. Bldg. 
Code Cong. Int'I, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en bane), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003) 
(Wiener, J., dissenting). 
1 19. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 3 1 1  ( 1 936); A.LA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 ( 1935); see infra Part III. 
1 20. Supra note 1 17. 
1 2 1 .  See Cmty. fo r  Creative Non-Violence v .  Reid, 490 U.S. 730 ( 1989) (factors bearing upon 
status of independent contractor under work-for-hire doctrine); United States v. Wash. Mint, L.L.C., 
1 1 5 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (D. Minn. 2000) (independent contractor coin within exception because fed­
eral mint workers lacked skill necessary to achieve public approval); see also Schnapper v. Foley, 
47 1 F. Supp. 426 (D.D.C. 1979) (independent contractor films within government works doctrine 
exception because using private filmmaker was not "an alternative to having one of [the agency's] 
own employees prepare the work"). Reid's independent contractor test may be read to give federal 
agencies latitude in characterizing the status of persons they hire to generate standards and the copy­
right consequences. While judicial deference to such conclusions may be warranted, additional 
regulatory oversight may be desirable to assure optimal classification. See supra notes 2 1-22 and 
accompanying text; see also infra Part III. 
1 22. See Reg. S-X, 1 7  C.F.R. § 2 1 0.2-01 (2004). 
1 23. I served as director of one of ISB 's task forces during 1999-2001 .  
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down and established rules it preferred, addressing precisely the contexts on 
which ISB had worked.124 To the extent that copyright in government works 
produced by independent contractors hinges on whether the government 
could produce the work itself, as a normative matter, PCAOB's standards 
should not be protected. 
3. Incentives 
As a matter of congressionally announced policy, incentives are another 
factor in assessing whether an independent contractor should be entitled to 
hold copyright in works it produces under contract with the federal govem­
ment.125 Congress created PCAOB and directed it to promulgate GAAS for 
public companies. That mandate moots incentive inquiries for PCAOB that 
copyright could provide.126 While simply paying an independent contactor to 
perform work would not necessarily deprive it of copyright, in PCAOB's 
case its function is far broader and ongoing: it is establishing law, investigat­
ing compliance with it, and enforcing those laws against citizens. 
The ongoing funding of these operations likewise renders nugatory 
questions of copyright-driven incentives for others. PCAOB has a congres­
sional grant of monopoly power over this production function. No other 
body is recognized to produce GAAS for SEC registrants, nor is there any 
mechanism in SOX for creating or recognizing any such alternative body. 
Given monopoly power in the production function, it is unnecessary to rec­
ognize the monopoly power of copyright in resulting work. This result also 
justifies authorizing others than PCAOB freely to create derivative works 
based on its standards as and after it generates them. Allowing such use 
would improve standard-making capabilities of standard setters currently 
promulgating auditing principles for non-SEC contexts (including AICPA) 
and will improve such capabilities of any successors to PCAOB Congress or 
the SEC may create in the future. 
Moreover, as with any standard setter, incentives measured by royalties 
and licensing fees likely drive an organization towards greater emphasis on 
quantity of production rather than quality of production. Thus it would be a 
mistake to believe that copyright incentives for PCAOB serve copyright's 
goals or the securities regulation goals underlying SOX's creation of 
PCAOB. Securities regulation goals include promoting reliable financial 
1 24. The SEC adopted auditor independence rules in 2001 and Congress enacted them into 
law, substantially verbatim, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Compare Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 1 07-204, § 20I (a), 1 16. Stat. 77 1  (amending 1 5  U.S.C. § 78j-1), with 1 7  C.F.R. 
§ 2 10.2-0l (c)(4)(i)-(ix) (2004) (the statute and the regulations restrict auditors from providing ex­
actly the same non-audit services, using nearly identical language). 
1 25. See supra notes 2 1 -22 and accompanying text. 
1 26. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 ( 1991 ); see also County 
of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 26 1 F.3d 1 79, 1 94 (2d Cir. 2001 ). If exceeding mini­
mum statutory mandate requires incentives, additional analysis may be necessary. It would 
recognize that copyright protection's availability does not depend on the quality of expression 
(compared to patentability, for example, which does depend on quality of invention). See Karjala, 
supra note 83. 
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reporting through superior audits in order to protect investors and the public 
interest. These goals likely are advanced by permitting free access to 
PCAOB standards, including rights to create derivative works based upon 
them. 
Finally, PCAOB's funding arrangements negate the relevance of royal­
ties or licensing fees and their incentive effects. PCAOB began operating in 
2003. For that year, operating revenues were provided virtually entirely by 
fees Congress levied on public companies.127 These totaled $52.8 million.128 
The remaining portion, $2 million, was provided by audit firm registration 
fees,129 which are allocated specifically to recovering related costs.130 Total 
expenses amounted to $29.4 million. The excess of revenue over expense, 
along with $400,000 in interest income, yielded an unrestricted net asset 
balance of $25.8  million.131 PCAOB simply does not need royalties or li­
censing fees from copyright on its work, as a matter of incentives or of 
budgeting generally. 
In its first years of operation, PCAOB produced few of its own standards 
worth publishing or selling-under copyright or otherwise. I ts adoption of 
GAAS promulgated by AICPA in prior decades raises the question whether 
PCAOB has the right to copy and distribute this material. As critically, does 
PCAOB have the right freely to use these standards to improve them? That 
is, does AICPA have copyright over these? The foregoing provides grounds 
for concluding that AICPA-and everyone else-should be free to use and 
modify PCAOB standards. The reciprocal inquiry concerns what rights 
PCAOB-and everyone else-has as to AICPA standards.132 
B. \Veak Fonn: AICPA 
The easiest illustration of the weak form route that standards take into 
law in the accounting context occurs when a judge or regulator references 
textbooks, handbooks or other materials recognized as constituting a gener­
ally accepted accounting principle.133 Such references do not destroy 
1 27.  Pus. Co. ACCT. OVERSIGHT Bo., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 1 9  (2003 ).  
1 28. Id. 
1 29. Id. 
1 30. Id. at 1 5. 
1 3 1 .  Id. at 19 .  
1 32. PCAOB's website discloses the following in explaining its adoption of AICPA materials 
as its own standards: 'The AI CPA asserts a copyright in the AI CPA Codification and standards. This 
material is being displayed on the PCAOB's Web site pursuant to a license and is displayed with an 
AICPA copyright notice." Pus. Co. ACCT. OVERSIGHT Bo., INTERIM STANDARDS: COPYRIGHT NO­
TICE, http://www.pcaobus.org/standards/interim_standards/copyright.asp (last visited June 7, 2005). 
PCAOB's rights thus depend on the scope of this license. PCAOB does not otherwise have any 
copyright in AI CPA standards because PCAOB did not create them. 
1 33. This is possible under AICPA's Statement on Auditing Standards No. 69, which defines a 
hierarchy of sources that constitute generally accepted accounting standards; when the listed guid­
ance does not address a matter, authority may be found in textbooks, handbooks, and articles. 
CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards 
No. 69, § 4 1 1 .05 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 200 l ). 
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copyright. However, to the extent such materials represent embodiment in 
law implicating due process matters, such materials could not be restricted 
from public access. Traditional jurisprudence in the law of evidence and 
Constitutional law implicitly recognizes such concerns. 134 
When such materials provide a more comprehensive basis for evaluating 
legal obligations, access concerns become proportionately more prominent, 
even when the materials are embodied in law by mere citation. This more 
interesting-and important---context is illustrated by AICPA's role in estab­
lishing accounting standards. AICPA is a private not-for-profit association 
whose leadership is not appointed by nor overseen by any governmental 
authority. Its work is conducted for the trade association at large, for the 
profession of CPAs, and its promulgations of GAAS and GAAP address a 
wide range of circumstances beyond the SEC's purview. References to its 
standards have been far broader than passing references such as to text­
books, but their embodiment in law has nevertheless been attenuated. 
1 .  Legal References 
As for AICPA's work on GAAS, Congress authorized PCAOB to adopt 
as initial or transitional standards "any portion of any statement of auditing 
standards or other professional standards that [PCAOB] determines satisfy 
the requirements of [the Act] and that were proposed by 1 or more profes­
sional groups of accountants." 135 It also directed that any such standards be 
separately approved by the SEC. Pursuant to this law, PCAOB announced 
that auditors of public companies must comply with GAAS as articulated by 
AICPA. 136 The SEC approved these standards. 137 They thus became embod­
ied in law through the weak form route. 
As for AICPA's works contributing to GAAP, they became embodied in 
law by weak form adoption as well, though in slightly different manner. In 
1 938, the SEC formally adopted a policy of recognizing accounting princi­
ples as acceptable for which "substantial authoritative support existed."138 
AICPA bodies were the primary providers of such support through 1973, 
and continued to provide supplemental authority after that year. The SEC 
reiterated its recognition in 1 973 when it also recognized FASB, stating that 
extant AICPA standards would continue to be so recognized unless super­
seded. 139 While the SEC has never similarly recognized AICPA's post- 1973 
1 34. For example, references to obscure medical texts would simply not be probative of a 
physician's standard of care in a negligence case. 
1 35. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 103(a)(3)(B), 1 1 6  Stat. 756 (codi­
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 72 1 4). 
1 36. PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, Rules 3200T, 3300T, 3400T, 3500T, 3600T (Pub. Co. Acct. 
Oversight Bd. 2003). 
1 37. Order Regarding Section 103(a)(3)(B) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities Act 
Release No. 8222, Exchange Act Release No. 47745, 80 SEC Docket 142 (Apr. 25, 2003) [hereinaf­
ter SEC Order Approving PCAOB Initial Standards). 
1 38. Accounting Series Release No. 4, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'JI 72,005 (Apr. 25, 1938). 
1 39.  SEC, ASR No. 1 50, supra note 1 1 1 , at  276 n. I .  
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supplemental contributions, it relies on them in enforcement actions 140 and 
has more indirectly recognized them. 141 
2. Incentives 
Despite weak form embodiment in law of AICPA promulgations that 
bind public companies and their employees and advisors, the issue of incen­
tives remains for AI CPA as well as others similarly situated. 142 In general, 
AICPA has incentives to work for its trade association members. Since its 
members are subject to promulgations of FASB and PCAOB (and the SEC), 
AICPA has incentives to assist these organizations in standard setting. It 
does this through comment letters and other drafting exercises that it knows 
are not destined to constitute authoritative standards. These contributions 
make it difficult to imagine AICPA's leadership withdrawing from the field 
of accounting standard setting after having led it for nearly a century, 
whether or not its work is protected by copyright. 
On the other hand, after SOX the SEC ordained FASB as the national 
accounting standard setter, possibly erasing incentives for AICPA or any 
other body to contribute to standards-development by independent promul­
gations. This destruction of incentives, however, is not a matter of copyright 
law, making the question of incentives as a matter of copyright law moot. 
Some residual incentives to promulgate formal stances on accounting mat­
ters may remain to the extent that FASB 's SEC-designation is neither 
irrevocable nor necessarily exclusive. 143 This incentive exists as a matter of 
competition for regulatory recognition, however, not so much as a conse­
quence of the copyright regime. 144 
Furthermore, neither SOX's creation of PCAOB nor the SEC's recogni­
tion of FASB alters the role AICPA plays in creating accounting standards 
for entities outside the jurisdiction of the federal securities laws. These in­
clude private enterprises, not-for-profit organizations, individuals, and 
1 40. See, e.g., Avon Prods., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-462 1 5, 78 SEC Docket 70 
(July 1 7, 2002); America Online, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-4278 1 ,  72 SEC Docket 1 009 
(May 1 5, 2000). 
1 4 1 .  First, PCAOB adopted AICPA-GAAS, including Statement of Auditing Standard No. 69, 
which defined the "GAAP hierarchy" that includes post-1973 AICPA promulgations. Second, in 
2003 the SEC endorsed PCAOB 's adoption of these auditing standards establishing the GAAP hier­
archy. SEC Order Approving PCAOB Initial Standards, supra note 1 37.  
142.  Many persons may have incentives to participate in establishing accounting standards; 
existing literature establishes a "GAAP hierarchy," defining a priority among GAAP sources that 
begins with pronouncements of FASB and AICPA and concludes with a catch-all that includes arti­
cles, handbooks, textbooks and similar resources. See supra notes 133 ,  1 4 1 .  Some believe too many 
accounting standard setters exist. See Grossfeld, supra note 98. 
1 43. This is the SEC's position. See infra Section 11.C.3 (FASB 's current statutory role). 
1 44. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'!, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 ,  805 (5th Cir. 2002) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003) (plaintiff and other code writers have "survived and grown over 
60 years, yet no court has previously awarded copyright protection for the copying of an enacted 
building code under circumstances like these"); see also Karjala, supra note 83 (noting that the 1 980 
BOCA opinion expressed reservations and it was only in the 1 994 CCC case that such judicial pro­
tection was first expressed). 
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governmental entities. While these organizations and their advisors may be 
bound, as a functional matter of law, by applicable AICPA pronouncements, 
they are so bound as a result of weak form reference to these pronounce­
ments in various legal materials, ranging from one-off judicial opinions to 
145 statutory or regulatory reference. 
Withdrawing copyright from AICPA works could, in theory, reduce 
AICPA's production incentives, at least as a matter of quantity. As noted, 
however, some evidence suggests that AICPA over-produced quantities of 
materials, paying inadequate attention to quality. 146 On the other hand, a re­
view of AICPA's financial performance and the role of sales in its budget 
suggest that copyright revenue is not a main reason or motivation for its 
production of materials. 
1 I� f As a percentage of total revenue, AICPA's sa es hover around 1 8%. 0 
AICPA's $ 165 million in 2003 revenue, for example, $3 1 million is from 
sales (in 2002, these figures were $ 1 62 million and $33 million). 148 AICPA's 
sales arms sustained significant losses and as of mid-2003 suffered a com­
mon stockholders' deficit of $85 million, funded primarily by preferred 
stockholders. 149 While AICPA boasted positive net unrestricted assets from 
1 999 through 200 1 ,  it accumulated a deficit during 2002 and 2003, and ran a 
net revenue-expense deficit in each of those years. 150 
These difficulties besetting AICPA likely reflect that AICPA's primary 
mission is to serve as a trade association for accountants. Trade associations 
are not in the business of making money. Not only are they not likely to be 
good at this, profit-seeking is likely to disaffect association members not 
sharing in profits as owners. AICPA's financial performance mirrors that of 
traditional guilds, not profit-seeking enterprises. Selling products is thus not 
exactly a good business for AICPA, providing no evidence that these reve­
nue streams are a source of AICPA production incentives. It is thus difficult 
to conclude that copyright protection is an important motivator in inducing 
AICPA to contribute to standard-setting processes. 
Finally, protecting AICPA copyright in its historical works would impair 
PCAOB 's ability freely to use and distribute this work, including those it 
145. E.g. , GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS 'l[ l .09 (U.S. Comptroller Gen. 2003). In some 
circumstances, courts have expressly rejected GAAP as a binding legal standard. See, e.g. , Klang v. 
Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., 702 A.2d 1 50, 1 5 5  (Del. 1997). 
1 46. See supra text accompanying note 98; see also SEC, STUDY PuRSUANT TO SECTION 
108(D) OF THE SARBANES-0XLEY ACT OF 2002 ON THE ADOPTION BY THE UNITED STATES FINAN­
CIAL REPORTING SYSTEM OF A PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING SYSTEM (2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm (last modified July 25, 2003) [hereinafter 
SEC, STUDY ON ADOPTING PRINCIPLE-BASED ACCOUNTING SYSTEM). 
147. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED Pus. ACCOUNTANTS, 2002-2003 ANNUAL REPORT, available at 
http://www.aicpa.org/about/annrpt/homepage.htm. 
148. Id. at 1 9. Sales derive from copyrighted accounting publications of the Accounting Prin­
ciples Board ("APB"") and the Committee on Accounting Procedures ("CAP"), as well its other 
promulgations that constitute supplemental sources of GAAP, and all AICPA's GAAS promulga­
tions. 
149. ld. at 30 n. 12. 
150. Id. 
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formally adopted as its own. This impairment could reduce the quality of 
standards PCAOB and other successor bodies produce. While this privilege 
can be important to successor bodies, it risks further impairing incentives in 
present bodies. That is, if AICPA knows successors (including PCAOB) can 
simply copy its promulgations, as well as use them as first drafts of new 
standards, AICPA incentives to produce may incrementally decline. 
On balance, to the extent AICPA accounting materials are embodied in 
law and bear on the legal obligations of managers, accountants and auditors, 
the requirement of public domain may outweigh any residual incentive re­
quirements for the AICPA. The standards are thus entitled to thin copyright 
protection, at best. This likely remains the case when rights to create deriva­
tive works are included in the calculus. The balancing inquiry is certainly far 
closer in the case of AICPA than with PCAOB (or FASB, as discussed be­
low). 
3 .  Q ualifying Conventions 
While resolving close cases in favor of derecognizing copyright is de­
fensible given copyright's thin protection of standards and utilitarian 
underpinnings, other qualifying doctrines can be sought. These are interme­
diate measures between completely retaining and completely derecognizing 
copyright. Such measures can be tailored to circumstances in which stan­
dards embodied in law create public access needs yet are produced by 
private bodies requiring production incentives that copyright provides. They 
can also be adapted to provide authorization for third parties to create de­
rivative works in appropriate cases, as where standards are complex and 
dynamic. 
The most general copyright limitation applicable to standards embodied 
in law is due process. To the extent legal materials define rights and duties 
of citizens, they must be freely accessible or else run afoul of due process 
considerations. It is possible to treat this due process constraint as a qualify­
ing doctrine in that persons denied access have a defense to charges of 
violating a standard or that copyright infringement would be excused.151 But 
this characterization is unsatisfactory because it does not promote access 
and it arises in an ex post context. Needed are mechanisms, ex ante, to pro­
mote free access, avoid resort to litigation in which such defenses are 
asserted and, in appropriate circumstances, authorize production of deriva­
tive works. 152 
1 5 1 .  This characterization appears in both Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. A ss 'n, 1 2 1  
F.3d 5 1 6  (9th Cir. 1 997), amended by 1 33 F.3d 1 140 (9th Cir. 1 998), cen. denied, 524 U.S. 952 
( 1 998), and Judge Wiener's Veeck dissent, in Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int '/, Inc. ,  293 F.3d 79 1 ,  
8 1 0  (5th Cir. 2002) (en bane), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003). 
1 52. Such qualifying doctrines are mentioned in the cases discussed in Section l.C. See supra 
notes 49-50 and accompanying text; supra note 39 and accompanying text. Judge Wiener's dissent­
ing opinion in Veeck also mentioned implied license and waiver. 293 F.3d at 8 IO. But such exercises 
of voluntary authorization or relinquishment of a known right are not adaptable for inclusion in an 
ex ante prescriptive framework. The doctrines may bear on any takings analysis arising from gov­
ernmental embodiment of private standards in public law. See infra Section IIl.D. 
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Existing fair use doctrine may encompass many circumstances in which 
the copyright consequences of embodying standards in law are at issue. As 
Section l.D. demonstrated in discussing the scope of copyright protection, 
standards likely drive the broadest possible scope of fair use. As with due 
process, however, fair use is a defense to copyright infringement allegations, 
an ex post posture that a prudent framework for evaluating copyright stan­
dards embodied into law would rely upon only as a back-up.153 Courts 
should use such doctrines to resolve disputes, but a coherent policy requires 
an administrative mechanism to provide solutions ex ante. 
More promising ex ante solutions are compulsory licensing arrange­
ments. 154 The Copyright Act provides numerous examples of these 
arrangements in which copyright is recognized but owners are obliged to 
grant licenses to use works at designated fee levels. 155 Properly designed, 
these can optimize competing policy objectives. 156 While critics note that 
they also reduce incentives for actors to search for privately negotiated 
terms of access, 157 these criticisms are inapposite to the context of standards 
embodied in law implicating due process concerns. 
Others may object to using compulsory licensing for standards because 
they believe that standards deserve no copyright protection at all. These op­
posing views reflect the fact that compulsory licensing schemes are 
controversial. But they also suggest, rightly, that such an approach can be an 
ideal way to balance policy trade-offs in many weak form embodiment 
cases and would be particularly suitable in the case of AICPA. 158 It guaran­
tees access while providing any needed funding. 159 They can also be used to 
1 53. Copyright's idea-expression distinction and merger doctrine suggest a narrow scope of 
copyright protection for standards, before and after embodiment, but these tools are applied ex post. 
See supra Section I.D. 
1 54. See Practice Mgmt. , 121  F.3d at 5 1 9. 
1 55. E.g., 17 U.S.C. § I l l  (2000) (cable television); 1 7  U.S.C. §§ 1 1 4-15 (2000) (sound 
recordings); 17 U.S.C. § 1 18 (2000) (public broadcasting); 17 U.S.C. § 1 1 9 (2000) (satellite); see 
also 17 U.S.C. § 1 16 (repealed 1993) (jukeboxes). 
1 56. See generally Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and 
Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1 107, 1 1 27-39 (1 977). 
1 57. Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2655 ( 1 994); see also Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property 
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1 293 ( 1993). 
1 58. See Barbara A. Ringer, Copyright in the 1980's, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 299 ( 1976). 
In fashioning compulsory licensing arrangements, U.S. lawmakers must assure compliance with 
applicable international treaties, including the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPs) treaty. See David Nimmer, GATT's Entertainment: Before and NAFTA, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. 
L.J. 1 33, 147-50 ( 1 995). Establishing compulsory licensing arrangements for standards embodied in 
law should easily satisfy TRIPs, which limits copyright restrictions according to reasonableness 
standards. 
1 59. Another alternative is an open-access concept. Standard setters fix the work in an elec­
tronic format and retain copyright, but permit users in perpetuity free access and limited copying 
rights. See Samuel E. Trosow, Copyright Protection for Federally Funded Research: Necessary 
Incentive or Double Subsidy?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 6 1 3, 67 1-72 (2004). This guarantees 
access but provides no funding. 
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distinguish various rights that copyright law provides, ranging from rights to 
copy to rights to prepare derivative works. 
Another useful qualifying convention may be administered by the gov­
ernmental entity embodying standards in law. The entity could simply 
require a standard setter to provide greater access to recognized standards or 
to withdraw recognition of those standards. It could also address questions 
of derivative rights. A partial version of this approach is implicitly used by 
many federal governmental agencies when embodying standards into law 
through incorporation by reference. 160 This resembles the stance that the 
SEC now favors for FASB's promulgation of accounting standards, dis­
cussed next. 
C. Semi-Strong Fonn: FASB 
Federal securities laws vest the SEC with authority to define generally 
accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"). 161 The SEC traditionally dis­
charges this responsibility by looking to accounting standards generated by 
professional organizations. In 1973, the SEC formally recognized FASB 
pronouncements as establishing authoritative GAAP. 162 In 2002, SOX im­
posed boundaries on this traditional SEC policy, including requiring any 
recognized standard setter to be funded entirely by fees that Congress levies 
bl . . 163 on pu 1c compames. 
Pursuant to SOX, FASB applied to the SEC for recognition and the SEC 
approved this request. 164 In doing so, the SEC noted that such recognition is 
permitted under SOX's boundaries only when a standard setter is able to 
assist the SEC in meeting requirements of the federal securities laws, includ­
ing helping to improve the reliability of financial reporting. 165 The SEC opined 
that FASB's overseer, the Financial Accounting Foundation ("FAF"), 166 met 
1 60. Part ill, infra, builds upon this insight to propose requiring the Director of the Federal 
Register to include an overall assessment of copyright consequences when approving federal em­
bodiment of standards in law. 
1 6 1 .  See, e.g., Securities Act o f  1 933, 1 5  U.S.C. § §  77g, 77s(a), 77aa(25) & (26) (2000). 
1 62. SEC, ASR No. 150, supra note 1 1 1 . Formal approval of FASB promulgations by the 
SEC is not required. In fact, FASB promulgations also address entities outside the SEC's jurisdic­
tion. E.g., FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 1 17 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1 993). However, the SEC exerts 
significant influence over FASB and as a practical matter no accounting standard applicable to pub­
lic companies is adopted without the SEC's functional approval. Congress also exercises direct 
oversight of FASB through various standing committees, and occasionally threatens to terminate its 
status or uses other means to influence the standards it promulgates. E.g., Equity Expansion Act of 
1 993, H.R. 2759, 103d Cong. ( 1 st Sess. 1 993); DONALD E. KIESO, ET AL., INTERMEDIATE AC­
COUNTING 87 1 ,  997-98 (1 0th ed. 2001 ); ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET, 1 09-13 ,  24 1 
(2002). 
1 63. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 108 (2002). 
1 64. SEC Policy Statement Reaffirming FASB Status, supra note 1 1 1 .  
1 65. Id. 
1 66. The Financial Accounting Foundation is a Delaware corporation organized in 1972 to 
operate exclusively as a Section 501 (c)(3) entity under the Internal Revenue Code. In addition to 
overseeing FASB, it oversees Governmental Accounting Standards Board ("GASB"), promulgator 
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this and other SOX requirements. 167 With this congressionally mandated SEC 
recognition, FASB now receives 100% of its funding from congressionally 
levied fees on public companies. 
1 .  Public Domain 
As a result of the SEC's formal anointment of FASB in 1973, and its 
congressionally inspired reaffirmation in 2003, FASB 's pronouncements are 
embodied in law. Preliminary doubt thus arises as to whether these pro­
nouncements remain eligible for copyright. This is particularly so given that 
this otherwise private body is now funded entirely by congressionally levied 
fees. Based on these considerations, the SEC has drawn the policy conclu­
sion that FASB should make its standards freely available. In a SOX­
mandated study of the quality of U.S. accounting standards, the SEC ex­
plained: 
[There is no] single, searchable database containing all of the authoritative 
guidance . . . .  [S]uch a database should be more readily available to ac­
counting professionals . . . .  [and] to financial statement users seeking to 
better understand the meaning of financial statements . . . . FASB should 
have the responsibility for developing and maintaining the resource . . . .  
[T]he key question is whether this resource should be freely available to 
the public or should be made available on a subscription or cost-per-access 
basis. [Given SOX's funding of FASB,] we believe that the long-run goal 
should be for the FASB 's documents to be freely available. 168 
This SEC policy statement speaks firmly in declaring the importance of 
access and its reference to FASB 's funding under SOX shows the irrele­
vance of FASB incentives. 169 On the other hand, the statement does not 
address rights to create derivative works that could promote incremental im­
provement of standards quality. A coherent policy should address this question 
as well. 110 Moreover, additional attention to incentives and to related policy 
of accounting principles for governmental entities. This relationship and its problems are discussed 
below in this section. 
1 67.  SEC Policy Statement Reaffirming FASB Status, supra note 1 1 1 . The SEC concluded 
that "the standards set by the FASB are recognized as 'generally accepted' under section 108 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act." Id. 
1 68. SEC, STUDY ON ADOPTING PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING SYSTEM, supra note 146, 
pt. IV.E (emphasis added). 
1 69. FAF's 2004 Financial Statements claim: "In 2003, FASB made its Statements available 
for downloading without charge from the Board's website." FIN. ACCT. FOUND., 2004 ANNUAL 
REPORT 29 (2005). This disclosure is potentially misleading in that (a) the materials are in PDF 
(portable data format, meaning secure against digital manipulation) and (b) only the most basic 
materials are so available, omitting those addressing the more difficult and uncertain areas of ac­
counting, where legal risks arising from non-compliance are greatest. The website announces 
customary assertions of copyright and demands that users assent to their terms, including limitations 
on use, copying and distribution. 
1 70. In FASB's case, the SEC participates alongside it in developing standards, not only in a 
supervisory capacity but as an independent standard setter. See, e.g., The Last-In, First-Out Method 
of Accounting for Inventories, Securities Act Release No. 6325, Exchange Act Release No. 1 79 1 2, 
23 SEC Docket (July 2, 198 1 ); Adoption of Requirements for Financial Accounting and Reporting 
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matters bear examination for their utility both as a complete assessment of 
FASB 's status and for lessons applicable to many other contexts in which 
private standards are embodied in public law, particularly those following 
the semi-strong form route. 
2. Economic Incentives 
Until SOX, publication sales represented the lion's share of FASB's op­
erating revenues. In 2002, before SOX took effect, FASB generated $ 1 3 .3  
million in  sales revenue with an additional $3.9 million in revenue from pri­
vate contributions. 17 1  In 2003, after SOX, FASB received $ 19.7 million from 
fees Congress levied on public companies to cover its entire budget and 
ceased accepting private contributions. Yet it continued to sell products, 
generating $ 12.6 million in sales. 1 72 Before SOX, sales proceeds may have 
been important to provide FASB not only incentives but sustenance; 173 after 
SOX, such proceeds· are unnecessary for either purpose. 174 
3 .  Non-Economic Incentives 
FASB also has non-economic incentives to produce accounting 
standards. Unlike PCAOB's unique statutory production monopoly, SOX 
permits FASB competitors to vie for recognition as accounting standard 
setters. 175 The implicit theory is that competition among standard setters for 
recognition is desirable, and that a hierarchy among their pronouncements 
can be established, so that any number of potential standard setters could 
both compete for and gain SEC recognition. 176 This generates incentives for 
FASB to produce standards independent of sales from publications or 
copyright-induced incentives. 177 This view is confirmed by FASB 's 
Practices for Oil and Gas Producing Activities, Securities Act Release No. 5966, Exchange Act 
Release No. 15 108, 1 5  SEC Docket 929 (Aug. 3 1 ,  1 978); SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 1 02, 
75 SEC Docket 890 (July 6, 200 1 ); SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. I O I ,  7 1  SEC Docket 590 
(Dec. 3, 1 999); SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 1 999 WL 1 123073 (Aug. 1 2, 1999). SEC 
promulgations would benefit considerably from the free ability to build upon FASB works. 
1 7 1 .  FIN. ACCT. FOUND., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT (2005). Compare FASB's sales as a percent­
age of revenue of approximately 76% with AICPA ( 1 8%, supra text accompanying note 144) and 
the building code-producer in Veeck (33%, supra text accompanying note 69). 
1 72. FIN. ACCT. FOUND., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT (2005). 
1 73. As to incentives, compare supra note 1 4 1 ,  noting observations that standard setters oper­
ated for generations with no judicial awards of copyright protection over their standards that are 
embodied in law. 
1 74. Excess FASB revenues in 2003 were used to fund operations of its sister organization, 
GASB, discussed infra Section 11.C.6. 
1 75. That is the SEC's interpretation of SOX. See SEC Policy Statement Reaffirming FASB 
Status, supra note 1 1 1 , at n.5. 
1 76. For example, AICPA's Statement on Auditing Standards No. 69 provides a GAAP hierar­
chy among existing standards. See supra notes 1 3 1 ,  1 38, 1 39; see also supra Section l.D. 
1 77. If recognizing multiple standard setters presents reconciliation or conflict risks then any 
number of potential standard setters can vie for SEC recognition, but the SEC ultimately would 
designate one. 
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application to the SEC for recognition as a statutory standard setter under 
sox. 11s 
This policy and related competitive incentives also justify concluding 
that there is no reason to cement FASB's leadership position by advantages 
that copyright provides. That conclusion extends to derivative works. FASB 
competitors could freely use FASB standards to create derivative works, 
yielding competitors demonstrating superior capability to produce quality 
standards. Far from reducing FASB's incentives to produce requisite stan­
dards, the competition should reinforce them. 
4. Standard Setter Independence 
A standard setter's independence can influence the policy perspective 
with respect to copyright in its works. 179 FASB 's independence hinges on an 
important securities law policy matter. SOX expressed concern that FASB 's 
independence from the accounting profession was compromised by its prac­
tice of accepting contributions from the profession to fund its operations. 1so 
It addressed this concern by fully funding FASB. In doing so, however, it 
authorized FASB to use additional revenue sources, including from publica­
tion sales, but only if this does not impair its independence, in fact or 
appearance, in the SEC's judgment. 1s 1  
FASB 's independence can be influenced by whether and how it sells its 
products. One danger is that nominal product purchasers are clandestine 
contributors (or may be so perceived). FASB's pre-SOX practice was to 
provide complimentary subscriptions to its donors, isz a practice it ceased 
after SOX prohibited it from receiving contributions to preserve independ­
ence from subscribers. 1s3 Critical to the SEC's judgment about the effects of 
publication sales on FASB independence is whether sales are monopolized 
1 78. It does not appear that any other body applied for recognition-including AICPA. FASB 
thus signals that it possesses incentives that others do not. In AICPA's case, it may have incentives to 
try, but in the political climate of the period when SOX was enacted, it had no chance of ordain­
ment. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light 
Reform (And It Might Just Work), 35 U. CONN. L. REv. 9 1 5  (2003). 
1 79. Veeck's dissent made this point in considering the value to a standard setter of revenue 
streams from publications sales. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'!, Inc., 293 F.3d 79 1 ,  8 14-1 5  
(5th Cir. 2002) (en bane) (Wiener, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003). 
1 80. Before SOX, FASB was funded by a combination of private contributions, including 
from the accounting profession, and sales of its publications. For example, in 2002, before SOX, 
AICPA contributed $2 per member to support FASB and AICPA boasts approximately 335,000 
members. AM. INST. OF CERTIAED Pus. ACCOUNTANTS, 2002--03 ANNUAL REPORT 13 ,  27 (2003). 
1 8 1 .  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 1 07-204, § 1 09(i), 1 1 6 Stat. 745 (2002). The 
SEC's public statements authorizing FASB 's funding from congressionally levied fees provides no 
indication that the SEC considered the effects of copyright on FASB's independence. ORDER RE­
GARDING REVIEW OF FASB ACCOUNTING SUPPORT FEE UNDER SECTION 1 09 OF THE SARBANES-
0XLEY ACT OF 2002, SECURITIES ACT RELEASE No. 8389, Exchange Act Release No. 49290, 82 
SEC Docket 669 (Feb. 20, 2004); see also infra text accompanying notes 1 88-193 (reviewing this 
SEC statement in relation to incoherence of the funding system SOX establishes). 
1 82. FIN. ACCT. FoUND., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT (2005). 
1 83. Id. 
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or competitive. If copyright is sustained, then FASB is the only source from 
which to buy its materials, directly or through licensees. This makes it easy 
to disguise contributions as sales. If products are freely available, unusually 
high-volume purchases from FASB would appear as red flags of influence­
seeking. Accordingly, not recognizing copyright in FASB works advances 
SOX's legislative purpose of insulating FASB from parochial influence. 184 
5. Standards Quality 
In addition to the compelling policy objectives favoring relinquishing 
copyright to create free access for those legally subject to FASB pro­
nouncements (and the public at large), a related policy concerns its effect on 
accounting standards. The SEC statement quoted above urging FASB to 
relinquish copyright was made in the context of a congressionally mandated 
SEC study concerning the quality of U.S. accounting standards. A wide de­
bate erupted after the staggering accounting debacles of the early 2000s 
regarding whether FASB 's GAAP is too dense and rule-bound or too general 
and principles-based. 185 This criticism, which is legitimate, may evidence 
skewed incentives to produce greater quantities of standards rather than 
standards of superior quality. Taking copyright's economic incentives out of 
the equation may thus enhance the quality of FASB 's standards.186 
Permitting publishers to compete freely could produce considerable ad­
ditional public benefits, further weighting the public policy balance towards 
derecognizing copyright to standards embodied in law using the semi-strong 
form route. This step could produce public benefits by promoting competi­
tion among providers for superior presentation of materials. Professional 
publishers likely are better equipped than trade associations or standard set­
ters to publish materials in beneficial ways, in terms of presentation and 
distribution. 187 Similarly, freer availability of standards may expose them to 
a broader audience inclined to provide criticism that can be necessary to 
improve standards quality. 
Absence of copyright need not deprive standard setters of rights to pub­
lish and sell materials. Subject to independence effects of allowing sales, 
official promulgators could enjoy an economic advantage from that status. 
For example, when the status of pronouncements is functional law, users 
1 84. The relation among sales, copyright and independence often will be an important factor 
in evaluating copyright standards embodied in law. In fact, SOX applies the same SEC-determined 
test to the effect of sales on PCAOB's independence. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 1 07-
204, § 1 09, 1 16 Stat. 745 (2002). 
1 85. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 4 1 7, 429 ( 1984). 
1 86. This point complements the related point that in a system where successive standard 
setters establish GAAP and GAAS, they may need to rely upon and use work of predecessors to 
maximize standards quality. See supra Section I.E. 
1 87. A leading example is John Wiley & Sons, which serves as FASB 's licensee and publisher 
and publishes well-regarded texts on GAAP and GAAS that are in tum copyrighted by AICPA. 
Others include publishers of legal materials: large houses such as Thomson, Reed Elsevier and 
Wolters Kluwer and smaller presses such as Anderson Publishing Co., Bureau of National Affairs, 
Carolina Academic Press, Law Office Systems and Practicing Law Institute. 
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require an official text, updated regularly. In intellectual property terms, an 
official standard setter's trademarks or service marks can carry substantial 
economic value in the marketplace. 188 Accordingly, FASB likely would still 
generate revenues from publications (as would PCAOB and perhaps even 
AICPA) whether or not related works were protected by copyright. 
6. Secondary Incentives: GASB 
As noted, while SOX commands funds for 100% of FASB's budget, 
FASB continues to sell products to generate revenues far exceeding its 
budget. It uses the excess to fund the standard-setting activities of its sister­
organization, GASB, the accounting standard setter for governmental enti­
ties. This use of sales proceeds raises a host of further issues pivoting 
around what might be called secondary incentives-that is, a standard setter 
may benefit from incentives copyright provides not to produce its own stan­
dards but to fund production of standards by others. 
In 2003, the Financial Accounting Foundation (overseer of both FASB 
and GASB) followed its traditional practice of providing audited financial 
statements covering activities of both FASB and GASB. In them, it pre­
sented revenues from contributions and sales separately for FASB and 
GASB. As SOX requires, the Foundation also prepared separate 2003 finan­
cial statements for FASB. 189 The only source of revenue presented in FASB 's 
stand-alone statements is the SOX accounting support fees (of $19.7 mil­
lion, plus $263,000 in services contributed). 190 The statements make no 
mention of any sales revenue. The Foundation explained that it reallocated 
these revenue sources from FASB to itself and to GASB. 191 
This reallocation is difficult to square with SOX, although SOX itself 
appears to be self-contradictory. One section of SOX directs that all of 
FASB 's budget is to be funded by congressionally levied fees while another 
section authorizes FASB 's budget to be funded by sales of its publications. 192 
It is impossible to reconcile these two provisions. 193 If all of the budget is 
paid by fees, what happens to sales revenue? If sales revenue defrays budg­
etary costs, how can all of the budget be paid by fees? The Foundation 
1 88. See Karjala, supra note 83. 
189. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1 08(b)(2). 
190. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, 2003 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 1 (2004). 
1 9 1 .  Supra note 1 82, at 30. 
192. Section 1 09(c)(I )  of SOX states that "all of the budget of the standard setting body re­
ferred to [FASB] . . .  shall be payable from annual accounting support fees . . . .  " Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act § 1 09(c)( I )  (emphasis added). Section 1 09(i) states that "Nothing in this section shall be con­
strued . . .  to prevent such organization from utilizing additional sources of revenue for its activities, 
such as earnings from publication sales, provided that each additional source of revenue shall not 
jeopardize, in the judgment of the [SEC], the actual and perceived independence of such organiza­
tion." Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 109(i) (emphasis added). 
193. Equally unhelpful is sub-section (f), which states: "The amount of fees collected under 
this section for a fiscal year on behalf of . . .  the standards setting body . . .  shall not exceed the 
recoverable budget expenses of the . . .  body . . . .  " Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 109(f). Recoverable 
budget expense may be determined before or after sales revenues are absorbed. 
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resolved this contradiction in SOX by reallocating FASB's revenue from 
publication sales to itself and to GASB, and by funding all of FASB's 
budget with congressionally levied fees. 
Increasing funding for GASB is desirable. 194 The Foundation's approach 
to meeting this goal, however, exposes a complex problem of incentives and 
budgeting. GASB may need these funds to provide both incentives and sus­
tenance. Yet the funds are derived from sales of products whose production 
requires no incentives (SOX pays for it), by a body (FASB) whose opera­
tions require no funding from copyrighted sales. 195 
The conundrum is due to the SOX funding system, which is incoherent 
in two ways. First, public companies must support GASB standards appli­
cable to governmental entities by contributing funds Congress intended to 
support FASB. Second, public companies must support FASB standards 
applicable not only to them but also to not-for-profit organizations, private 
enterprises, and individuals. 
This incoherence can be corrected by using the classification scheme 
this Article suggests. As to FASB, its promulgations applicable to public 
companies should be seen as taking the semi-strong form route into public 
law, paid for by public companies, subject to SEC oversight, and therefore 
should be treated as in the public domain. FASB promulgations applicable 
to other persons should be seen as taking the weak form route into public 
law so that FASB can retain copyright in these works (subject to qualifying 
conventions guaranteeing access) to recoup from sales the proceeds neces­
sary to provide incentives and sustenance to support this undertaking. 
For GASB, three alternatives appear. First, it could be recognized and 
funded by statute on terms equivalent to PCAOB, with fees levied on gov­
ernmental entities to which its standards apply. Under this approach, its 
promulgations would take the strong form route into public law for which 
no copyright is necessary or appropriate. While this is probably the superior 
alternative, 196 two other options appear. GASB could be (1)  so recognized 
and funded on terms equivalent to FASB, so that its promulgations are seen 
as taking the semi-strong form route into law with similar consequences or 
(2) permitted to retain copyright in its promulgations, and treated as taking 
the weak form route into legal recognition (also subject to qualifying con­
ventions guaranteeing access). 
The incoherence in SOX's funding system and the suggested menu of al­
ternatives to resolve it arise, in part, because no one is responsible for 
making the required classification deterrninations. 197 That is, in addition to 
1 94.' GASB needs both funding and insulation from parochial pressures that occasionally 
threaten its existence. See Opinion, GASB Faces the Fight of Its Life, AccT. TODAY, Jan. 19, 1998. 
1 95 .  See supra Section III.C.2. 
1 96. FAF is seeking this route in funding GASB. See FIN. AccT. FOUND., 2004 ANNUAL 
REPORT (2005). It lacks legal power to order funding; instead, it seeks to persuade governmental 
entities to which its accounting standards apply to provide support voluntarily. 
1 97 .  The SEC approved FASB's 2004 funding from fees Congress levied on public compa­
nies. ORDER REGARDING REVIEW OF FASB ACCOUNTING SUPPORT FEE UNDER SECTION 109 OF 
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, SECURITIES ACT RELEASE No. 8389, Exchange Act Release 
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the absence of a classification framework for evaluating copyright to stan­
dards embodied in law, there is no institutional mechanism for providing 
solutions. In the next Part, the classification scheme is generalized and insti­
tutional mechanisms are identified to implement it. 
III. GOVERNMENTAL STRATEGY 
The evolution in SEC policy concerning recognizing accounting stan­
dards promulgated by others shows the range of possible approaches to 
implementing such a governmental strategy. Until 1973, the SEC sought to 
rely extensively on the private sector, by pointing to AICPA bodies to estab­
lish standards; from 1 973 through 2002, it strengthened its reliance upon 
such bodies and simultaneously bolstered its influence over them. Since 
2002, that influence has risen to the congressional level, with SOX estab­
lishing and funding PCAOB to promulgate GAAS and defining FASB 's 
attributes and funding to establish GAAP. 
The SEC's policy of relying upon such bodies outside the formal federal 
budget reflects a governmental off-balance sheet financing strategy. But the 
SEC's experience of increasingly incorporating private bodies into formal 
public lawmaking shows the difficulties of achieving regulatory objectives 
when regulators lack direct control over the standard-setting process. The 
SEC has steadily ratcheted up its power over these bodies, indicating limita­
tions on the regulatory effectiveness of deference to private standard setters. 
The SEC's experience-if not its historical policy-characterizes like ef­
forts of other governmental entities. 
All governmental uses of privately promulgated standards are intended, 
in part, to conserve governmental resources. 198 Government seeks to lever­
age its regulatory effectiveness and oversight by piggybacking on costs 
expended in the private sector. At least in the case of the federal govern­
ment, it simultaneously seeks to preserve copyright in those privately 
199 promulgated standards. 
This twofold policy is at war with itself, as the SEC recognized when it 
urged FASB to relinquish copyright over its standards in favor of providing 
free public access.200 Optimizing leverage necessarily entails reduced copy-
No. 49290, 82 SEC Docket 669 (Feb. 20, 2004). It observed without noting the contradiction that 
SOX both provides all of the budget for a standard setter and that a standard setter can generate 
revenue from publication sales (subject to preserving its independence). The SEC stated without 
explanation that it "considered the interrelation of the operating budgets of the FAF, the FASB and 
the Government Accounting Standards Board . . . .  " Id. The SEC makes no mention of related effects 
on FASB's independence, standards quality or the funding system's incoherence. Nor did the SEC 
speak to FASB's pricing policies. Id. 
1 98. E.g., OMB Circular A- 1 19, 63 Fed. Reg. 33,8545, 33,8555 (Feb. 19, 1998). Calculating 
costs to assess whether to use private standards or to develop regulations internally must address a 
variety of costs associated with delegation of functions. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Gov­
ernment Regulation, 53 DuKE L.J. 389 (2003). 
199. See OMB Circular A- 1 19, 63 Fed. Reg. 33,8545, 33,8555 (Feb. 1 9, 1998). 
200. See supra text accompanying note 1 68. 
November 2005] Private Standards in Public Law 331  
right protection.201 While these competing objectives cannot easily be  recon­
ciled, trade-offs can be crystallized using this Article's three-class scheme to 
relate the leverage function to its copyright consequences.202 
Optimal leverage from using private standard setters occurs by the strat­
egy that minimizes use of governmental resources while maximizing 
achievement of regulatory objectives. Resource conservation is maximized 
when private standards are used by passing reference, incorporating benefits 
of privately produced standards without associated costs. But while this 
weak form route maximizes resource conservation, it may not maximize 
regulatory objectives. Maximizing regulatory objectives is achieved through 
the strong form route standards take into law, by formal designation of a 
statutory standard setter; optimization is achieved when costs are met by a 
governmentally directed function, but not from governmental revenues. In­
termediate leveraging occurs through the semi-strong form route. 
Apart from leverage, governmental strategy of embodying private stan­
dards in public law using the semi-strong form route confronts two 
administrative law constraints.203 First, constitutional principles nearly as old 
as those prohibiting copyrighting judicial opinions limit governmental dele­
gation of lawmaking functions to private parties.204 There may be some 
legitimate room for permitting private parties to perform lawmaking func­
tions. 205 But the assignment poses considerable questions of legitimacy206 
and implicates transcendent issues of democracy.207 Second, a powerful 
norm pulsing through the administrative lawmaking function requires publi­
cation of regulatory promulgations in the spirit of open government and 
public access to law.208 Federal lawmakers respect these animating themes 
20 I .  Achieving the objective of copyright preservation is possible in the weak form route, is 
not possible when using the strong form route and remains difficult in the semi-strong form route. 
202. My denomination of the governmental strategy as providing regulatory leverage receives 
the more stinging cast of an "aggravated free lunch" in Malla Pollack, Purveyance and Power; or 
Over-Priced Free Lunch: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Ally of the Takings Clause in the 
Public's Control of Government, 30 Sw. U. L. REV. 1 ,  1 34-35 (2000). 
203. These do not arise in the strong form route when a promulgator is a functional lawmaker 
and follows prescribed publication requirements nor in the weak form route when there is no pre­
tense of lawmaking and associated materials are or are not made widely available. 
204. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 ( 1936). 
205. A middle ground of private participation in regulatory practice is called negotiated rule­
making. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, Pub. L. No. 1 0 1 -648, 1 04 Stat. 4969 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 561-570); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 7 1  GEO. L.J. 1 (1981 ). 
206. See David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647 
(1986); David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 37 1 (2003). 
207. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 1 0-28 (3d ed. 
1999). To be distinguished from governmental delegation to private parties is the more contestable 
issue of legislative delegation to the executive branch or to administrative agencies. E.g., Whitman v. 
Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001) .  
208. A good specific example is that SOX requires the SEC to  approve all PCAOB standards 
using traditional administrative rulemaking processes beginning with release for public comment 
and concluding with publication in the Federal Register. See supra note 1 1 5. More general exam­
ples, all codified in the Administrative Procedure Act, include the following statutes: Freedom of 
Information Act of 1967, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l )-(3) (2000); Federal Advisory Committee Act of 
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by comporting with due process footings upon which such laws are 
founded.209 Steps include publication of adopted laws.210 
To illuminate governmental choices in establishing policy, the following 
discusses various sources and processes used to embody standards in law, 
sorted according to this Article's three-class scheme. It also proposes im­
plementation mechanisms to facilitate governmental navigation of these 
trade-offs. For the federal government, this involves appointing an adminis­
trative authority to serve a channeling function when receiving proposals 
from federal governmental entities to embody private standards in public 
law.21 1  Analogous mechanisms would be used at state and local governmen­
tal levels.212 
A .  Strong Fonn 
When a governmental authority promulgates standards for embodiment 
in law, no question of copyright arises, either because the standards assume 
the status of legislative enactment per se as a matter of due process (consti­
tutional law) or because of the government works doctrine (the Copyright 
Act). Hundreds of federal agencies promulgate standards of various kinds 
routinely. A prominent example is the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, created in 1901 as a non-regulatory federal agency within the 
Commerce Department to promote standards in a broad cross-section of 
fields.213 The National Institute of Standards and Technology makes its web­
site and its content widely accessible, noting that most "information 
presented on these pages is considered public information and may be dis­
tributed or copied."214 
In tum, federal law requires copies of governmentally generated stan­
dards to be deposited with the National Technical Information Service 
1972, Pub L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 ( 1 972); Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552b (2000). See PIERCE, supra note 207, at 420-23, 476-85. 
209. See PIERCE, supra note 207, at 226. 
2 1 0. See Administrative Procedure Act, § 552(a)(I )(D) (2000). 
2 1 1 .  For reasons of convenience described below, the Director of the Federal Register is likely 
best suited to assume this function for the federal government. 
2 1 2. Coordination among governmental entities can be arranged through an array of existing 
bodies engaged in kindred cooperative undertakings. A leading example is the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"), an organization created and funded by 
states which produces hundreds of model or uniform legal codes or standards, including the Uni­
form Commercial Code, the Uniform Probate Code, and Uniform Rules ofEvidence. Also helpful 
can be the American Bar Association, a private professional association of lawyers and producer of 
such works as the Model Business Corporation Act and the Model Rules of Professional Responsi­
bility. Other useful associations include Council of State Governments, National Conference of 
State Legislatures, National Association of Counties, National City Government Resource Link, and 
U.S. Conference of Mayors. 
2 1 3. Perhaps the most popular contribution of the National Institute of Standards and Tech­
nology is the Baldridge National Quality Program, which manages the annual Malcolm Baldridge 
National Quality Award to recognize performance excellence and quality achievement. 
2 1 4. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Disclaimer Statement, 
http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/disclaim.htm (last visited Sept. 15 ,  2005). 
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("NTIS").215 This Service is the federal government's clearinghouse for sci­
entific and technical information produced by or for federal agencies.216 
Information includes results from scientific and engineering research, as 
well as economic and market information relevant to business and indus­
try. 217 The NTIS catalogues, organizes, and disseminates resulting materials 
(totaling some 3 million items) to business, industry, academia and the gen­
eral public. According to its website, the NTIS "receives no appropriations 
and sustains its operations through the sale of such documents to the public 
and by providing related information-dissemination services to other Fed-
1 . ,,218 era agencies. 
One step removed from direct governmental production of standards is 
the anointment of a designated standard setter to produce standards embod­
ied in law using the strong-form route. To date, PCAOB appears to be the 
sole example of a governmental standard setter Congress designates as re­
siding outside the formal boundaries of the federal government.219 Internal 
federal standard setters abound and numerous federal corporations exist, 220 
but the latter do not generally produce standards embodied in law as 
PCAOB does. PCAOB 's public-body characteristics, moreover, alleviate 
concerns that congressional delegations of lawmaking power to it are un­
constitutional or illegitimate221 and PCAOB follows to a tee the publication 
and other requirements necessary to the legitimacy of administrative agency 
1 aki 222 awm ng. 
Despite absence of federal PCAOB-equivalents, the PCAOB model may 
be appealing to governmental agencies.223 The SEC struggled for years with 
AICPA in developing auditing standards that the SEC preferred;224 SOX pre­
sented the ultimate showdown of replacing AICPA with PCAOB. Other 
federal agencies may elicit superior standard setting from private organiza­
tions by threatening to persuade Congress to follow a similar route in their 
regulatory domain. If necessary funding sources can be obtained outside the 
federal budget as with PCAOB, this can be an ideal way to generate standards 
2 1 5 .  1 5  U.S.C. 3704b-2 (2000); see also 1 5  C.F.R. pt. 1 1 80 (2005). 
2 1 6. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1 1 5 1- 1 1 57, § 3704b (2000). 
2 1 7 .  1 5  C.F.R. § 1 1 80.2 (2005). 
2 1 8 .  National Institute o f  Standards and Technology, Section 5 1 5  Information Quality Stan­
dards, http://www.ntis.gov/new/quality.asp?loc=7-2-0. (last visited Sept. 1 5, 2005). 
2 1 9. See supra Section III.A. At the state level, the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) exhibits the strong form route of standards embodied in law. 
NCCUSL is created and funded by states for the purpose of drafting laws destined for state-adoption 
on a wide range of subjects from administrative law to zoning. Cf Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, 
The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 ( 1 995); James J. White, Ex 
Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2096 ( 1 99 1 ). 
220. See 3 1 U.S.C. § 9 1 0 1 (2)-(3) (2000). 
22 1 .  See supra Section Il.A.2. 
222. See Lebron v. Nat'! R.R Passenger Corp., 5 1 3  U.S. 374 ( 1 995). 
223. See, e.g. , supra text accompanying note 196 (suggested approach for GASB). 
224. See supra text accompanying notes 1 23-124 (SEC interaction with ISB). 
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while retaining regulatory control. Such an approach would also substan­
tially eliminate difficulties associated with copyright to standards embodied 
in law. 
B .  Weak Form 
While Dr. Samuel Johnson quipped that no one but a blockhead writes, 
except for money,225 the volumes of materials published suggest the cyni­
cism in this hyperbole. The vast majority of such materials likely would be 
produced even absent copyright incentives to do so (so long as attribution 
norms are maintained). Nevertheless, copyright is designed to provide in­
crementally requisite incentives-not quite rewards-for this labor and its 
utilitarian underpinnings justify preserving such incentives, if only to pro­
mote production of the minority of materials for which copyright is an 
inducement. Thus, passing references to these materials, even to contribute 
significantly to deciding a judicial case or prescribing a legislative or regula­
tory policy, should respect such copyright. 
Examples of how such private materials may be embodied in law fol­
lowing the weak form route abound. Two appeared in the cases discussed in 
Part I: ( 1) state legislators may reference valuation books on insured prop­
erty as a basis for establishing insurance loss payouts226 and (2) a federal 
agency may reference medical coding systems as a basis for processing re­
imbursement requests.227 In these examples, governmental leverage is 
exploited by avoiding costs to generate standards. Preserving copyright 
promotes incentives for numerous standard setters to vie for regulatory rec­
ognition, helping the regulator to a menu of alternatives. Provided materials 
are sufficiently available and recognized to justify such invocation, public 
domain concerns of due process and access diminish to the vanishing point. 
Similarly, the Practice Mana£.ement court gave examples of standards 
referenced in federal regulations.- 8 All illustrate the weak form route stan­
dards take into law, akin to the classic case of judicial references to Gray 's 
Anatomy. Thus copyright is not vitiated by: ( 1) federal court rules requiring 
attorneys to follow The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation, published 
by a group of law school journals;229 (2) an agency limiting reimbursable 
dental benefits to those listed in the reference work Current Dental Termi­
nology, published by the American Dental Association;230 or (3) an agency 
limiting reimbursement for medical costs associated with mental disorders 
listed in Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by 
225. 3 BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON 19 (G.B. Hill & L.F. Powell rev. ed., 1934) ( 1 79 1 ). 
226. CCC Info. Servs. Inc. v. MacLean Hunter Mkt. Rep., Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994). 
227. Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 1 2 1 F.3d 5 1 6  (9th Cir. 1 997), amended 
by 133 F.3d 1 1 40 (9th Cir. 1998), cen. denied, 524 U.S. 952 ( 1 998). 
228. Practice Mgmt., 1 2 1  F.3d at 5 1 9  n.5. 
229. E.g. ,  1 1  TH CIR. R. 28-l (k). 
230. 32 C.F.R. § 199. 13(e)(2) (2004). 
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the American Psychiatric Association.23 1 In each case, constitutional and 
prudential limitations assure related access. Such materials would not be 
entitled to such recognition unless they were readily available for access. 
When such materials supply a more general basis of legal obligations, 
additional qualifying conventions are necessary. Part H's discussion of 
AICPA's role in promulgating accounting standards for public companies 
illustrated this. Weak form references to these standards may not justify viti­
ating related copyright, but as sources of functional law, qualifying doctrines 
of f<l:ir use, compulsory licensing, or regulations mandating access are nec­
essary to meet due process requirements. Attention to the role of rights to 
create derivative works can also be important. At present, however, no 
mechanism exists for establishing these administrative necessities, except on 
an ad hoc basis through federal adjudication. 
C. Semi-Strong Fonn 
Between the relatively easy classes of cases arising under the strong and 
weak form routes standards take into law are the more difficult cases follow­
ing the semi-strong form route. In this context, a private-sector cottage 
industry promulgates standards, to which copyright's incentive structures 
may or may not contribute. Participants include organizations pursuing 
broad-gauged standard-setting and dissemination efforts232 and specialized 
. d d d 233 m ustry stan ar setters. 
How lawmakers embody standards produced by such organizations into 
public law varies. Some governmental authorities affirmatively encourage 
agencies to adopt private standards. Congress did so for the federal govern­
ment in the National Technology and Transfer Act,234 directing agencies to 
adopt private sector standards whenever practicable and appropriate; executive 
branch implementing guidance directed agencies to preserve copyright in such 
standards when embodied in law.235 Agencies follow a regulated and routine 
23 1 .  3 2  C.F.R. § 199.2 (2004). 
232. The National Information Standards Organization ("NISO") website boasts: "Standards 
are big business today and NISO has many partners in the standards area. The latest U.S. directory 
of standards developers lists over 700 standards developers responsible for over 90,000 national 
standards." NISO, Standards: Putting Innovation to Work, http://www.niso.org (last visited Jun. 1 2, 
2005). NISO identifies ANSI as the principal US standards-federation in that it accredits other stan­
dard setters (some 400 of them, including NISO). It also identifies the American Society for Testing 
Materials as sponsoring 1 28 standards committees for industry. NISO, The Standards World, 
http://www.niso.org/world/index.html (last visited Jun. 12 ,  2005). 
233. ANSI and numerous other organizations filed amicus briefs in Practice Management 
and Veeck. On its website, ANSI markets products promulgated by more than 60 standard-setting 
organizations. Am. Nat'l Standards Inst., eStandards Store: SDO Developers, http:// 
webstore.ansi.org/ansidocstore/sdo_developers.asp (last visited Jun. 1 2, 2005). 
234. Pub. L. No. 1 04- 1 1 3, 1 10 Stat. 783 ( 1996). 
235. OMB Circular A-1 19, 63 Fed. Reg. 33,8545, 33,8555 (Feb. 1 9, 1 998). 
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process when doing so.236 This process differs somewhat from traditional 
administrative rulemaking, particularly as to publication requirements. 
In traditional administrative rulemaking, agencies are required to publish 
resulting promulgations in the Federal Register.237 When embodying private 
standards in public law, however, Congress authorizes agencies to sidestep 
the publication requirement using an exception known as incorporation by 
reference.238 In particular, the Freedom of Information Act and implementing 
regulations direct that agencies incorporate copyrighted standards by refer­
ence into agency regulations. 239 Rather than publish embodied standards in 
the Federal Register in full, agencies simply refer to them. 
To be eligible for incorporation by reference under the statute, an agency 
must determine that standards are reasonably available to the class of per­
sons affected by the publication.240 Agencies must then submit proposed 
regulations to the Office of the Federal Register, and regulations only be­
come effective when published in the Federal Register. The Director of the 
Federal Register is charged with reviewing such submissions for approval or 
disapprovai.24 1 The Director's review includes a determination that materials 
incorporated by reference are reasonably available. 
Reasonable availability does not require that materials be free. In fact, 
wh.ile some standard setters do not require payment for reproduction,242 it is 
common for them to charge fees to defray associated publication and over­
head costs.243 They tend to follow the approach the National Technical 
Information Service uses by charging fees to recoup associated production 
costs (likely to be far more essential than copyright royalties to generate 
production). However, nothing prevents standard setters from charging the 
monopoly rates that copyright law facilitates (as FASB does, with the SEC's 
blessing244) or limiting third-party creation of derivative works. Nor does the 
236. See, e.g . ,  Standards for Business Practices of Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 39,053, 39,055 (Jul. 26, 1 996); III FERC Stats. & Regs. Regulations Preambles 'II 3 1 ,039 (Jul. 
1 7, 1996) [hereinafter, FERC Order]. 
237. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)( l )(D) (2000). The process that SOX 
directs the SEC and PCAOB to follow in PCAOB standard setting illustrates legitimate traditional 
practice. See supra note 1 1 5 .  
238. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l )(D). 
239. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l )  (2000); 1 C.F.R. 5 1 .7(4) (2005); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1 498 (2002). 
240. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l )  (2000); 1 C.F.R. § 5 1 . 7(4) (2005). 
24 1 .  See NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN. , FEDERAL REGISTER DOCUMENT DRAFTING 
HANDBOOK, 6-1 ( 1 998), available at http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/document_drafting_ 
handbook/document_drafting_handbook_faq.html (last visited Jun. 1 2, 2005). 
242. E.g. , FERC Order, supra note 236. 
243. Id. (citing ANSI, Why There Is a Charge for Standards and Standards Information, 
http://www.ansi.org/why-chrg.html (last visited Jun. 12 ,  2005) ("explaining why charges need to be 
assessed for standards even if obtained electronically, with no publishing costs")); see also ANSI, 
Why Charge for Standards, http://www.ansi.org/help/charge_standards.aspx?menuid=help (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2005) . .  
244. See supra note 192 (SEC approval of FASB 's budget). 
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process require lawmakers to publish resulting standards according to usual 
administrative practice. 
The same process-with associated infirmities-apglies when federal 
statutes direct agencies to incorporate private standards. 45 To illustrate, the 
Consumer Product Safety Act directs the Consumer Product Safety Com­
mission ("CPSC") to use private standards when possible and consistent 
with regulatory objectives.246 CPSC adopted regulations governing the test­
ing of bicycle helmets that incorporated, by reference, standards 
promulgated by private organizations.247 Regulations indicate that the Direc­
tor of the Federal Register approved incorporation by reference.248 Following 
the Director's  guidelines, CPSC states the name and addresses of the stan­
dards organizations from which copies of these standards are available and 
that they are available for copying from the Secretary of the CPSC. They are 
not published in the Federal Register. 
State and local governmental entities follow various processes to em­
body standards in law. This is illustrated by the building code cases.249 Codes 
were not referenced in passing but adopted formally by legislative bodies 
with binding effects.250 No additional legislative action appears to have been 
taken to promote access or address copyright consequences. This inaction 
left the conflict between public domain and copyright incentives for resolu­
tion by federal courts institutionally incapable of providing a comprehensive 
public policy framework.251 In fact, neither the BOCA court nor any of the 
three opinions in Veeck recognized that vitiating copyright raises questions 
under the takings clause of the Constitution.252 
Nor does it appear that any governmental authority recognized the con­
sequences of Veeck for other standards within its scope. Consider standards 
adopted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development for manu­
factured housing. Following procedures established in the Administrative 
Procedure Act and others summarized above, it incorporated by reference 
model codes of the Council of American Building Officials and the National 
Fire Protection Association.253 Under Veeck, this embodiment vitiates 
245. In legislation directing agencies to adopt private standards, Congress should specify 
copyright consequences by directing that a given standard setter make its works freely available, 
subject them to compulsory licensing or otherwise provide ex ante solutions to avoid the conundrum 
otherwise created. 
246. See Consumer Product Safety Act, 1 5  U.S.C. § 2056(b)(l )  (2000). 
247. 16 C.F.R. § 1 203.3 (2004). 
248. Id. § 1 203.3(b). 
249. See supra Section l.C. l ;  see also Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'! ,  Inc., 293 F.3d 791  
(5th Cir. 2002) (en bane), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003); BOCA ,  628 F.2d 730, 732 ( ! st Cir. 
1 980). 
250. Veeck, 293 F.3d at 793; BOCA, 628 F.2d at 730. 
25 1 .  See supra text accompanying notes 90-92. 
252. The CCC court (the used car valuation handbook case) recognized this in passing. See 
CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Rep., Inc., 44 F.3d 61,  73 n.29 (2d Cir. 1 994) (citing N.J. 
Admin. Code 1 1  :3-10.4 ( 1988); 1 1  N.Y. Admin. Code § 2 16.7(c) ( 1990)). 
253. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 200.926b, 200 app. A, 3280.801 (2004). 
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copyright. But no mechanism exists to make this determination and no 
f k . . 254 ramewor exists to govern 1t. 
D. Administration 
Alternative institutional arrangements may be designed to facilitate clas­
sifying standards embodied in law for copyright and lawmaking purposes.255 
For the federal government, an existing central participant in the embodi­
ment process is the Director of the Federal Register, who oversees the 
process and can be assigned the additional task of classification. State and 
local governmental authorities would follow similar procedures in confor­
mity with respective administrative and legal infrastructures.256 
The Director of the Federal Register would be charged with evaluating 
the route taken, as weak, semi-strong or strong. The Director would deter­
mine the co�yright effect of embodiment, applying the factors discussed in 
this Article. 57 In all strong form cases, no copyright may be granted. In 
other cases, classification analysis and copyright effects would proceed as 
follows. 
In weak form cases, copyright may be maintained, so long as the Direc­
tor confirms that designated materials are widely available (this is an 
evaluation the Director makes under existing practice). If not, the Director 
should suggest to the submitting agency that it require access by regula­
tion. 258 Failing this, the Director must determine whether compulsory 
254. Federal judges cite cascade effects on other works when upholding challenged copyright 
to standards embodied in law. See, e.g . ,  Veeck, 293 F.3d at 806 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting); Prac­
tice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 1 2 1 F.3d 5 16, 5 1 9  (9th Cir. 1997); CCC, 44 F.3d at 74; 
supra text accompanying notes 40-41 ,  47, 59. Such judicial reticence is prudent as a matter of fed­
eral court competence; absence of a policy framework for resolving it is a national regulatory 
abomination. 
255. Leading candidates include the Librarian of Congress, the Copyright Office, Copyright 
Royalty Judges, or the Director of the Federal Register. The Librarian of Congress and the Copy­
right Office possess requisite expertise concerning the scope of copyright protection. See Liu, supra 
note 9 1 ,  at 147-Q6. Copyright Royalty Judges possess expertise concerning compulsory licensing 
arrangements. As federal law's gatekeeper, however, the Director of the Federal Register is best 
positioned to provide general channeling functions. Accordingly, as discussed in the following text, 
an effective approach would repose overall administration in the Director of the Federal Register, 
with specific directives upon it and these other government organs to coordinate particular aspects. 
256. Virtually every state has adopted an administrative procedure act, ultimately modeled on 
the federal version, although derived from model codes promulgated by NCCUSL. See RONALD A. 
CASS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (4th ed. 2002) (This handily illustrates the 
need for standard setters to have the ability to prepare derivative works.). 
257. To recapitulate, key factors are free public access (emphasizing copyright's thin protec­
tive scope for standards) and incentives (emphasizing quality, not quantity, and promoting standard 
setter independence). The shape of these factors will vary with a case's particulars, such as govern­
ment's role in production (including under the government works doctrine and its independent 
contractor component), production incentives other than copyright, and the appropriateness of alter­
native qualifying conventions. 
258. This suggestion can embolden an agency to pressure standard setters in ways the agency 
otherwise may hesitate to do. This can be useful in both negotiated rulemaking, supra note 201 ,  and 
in the more general contexts in which agencies seek cordial relationships with those they oversee, 
including standard setters. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRAN-
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licensing is necessary. In this determination, the Director would coordinate 
with the Librarian of Congress, the Copyright Office, and Copyright Roy­
alty Judges. These bodies are currently required to participate in 
administering the Copyright Act's existing compulsory licensing arrange­
ments. 259 All possess expertise to guide the Director in making necessary 
determinations. 
In semi-strong form cases, the Director should make two procedural de­
terminations, likely already required but worth emphasizing. First, to police 
delegation, agencies must exercise judgment and reach an independent de­
termination of appropriateness as to private standards they embody in public 
law, to respect basic concepts reposing lawmaking functions in lawmakers. 
Second, to promote legitimacy, the Director should scrutinize incorporation 
by reference practices to concord with due process norms pervading tradi­
tional administrative processes,260 particularly concerning publication.261 In 
certain circumstances, the agency mandate to make materials publicly avail­
able may not be met by incorporation by reference but may require 
publication in the Federal Register.262 
In semi-strong form cases, the Director must make substantive determi­
nations as to whether copyright is derecognized. If so, the government must 
determine whether, and to what extent, embodiment constitutes a taking 
under the Constitution. Not all embodiments constitute takings, particularly 
for standards whose authors intend them for this purpose. 263 Such standard 
setters effectively grant an implied license to governmental entities to embody 
the standards in law. 264 License scope includes permitting citizens to use such 
works, negating takings claims.265 Many embodiments that are takings will 
SCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 199-203 ( 1 992). For example, the SEC urges FASB to 
make its standards freely available, supra text accompanying note 168, but to maintain a cordial 
working relationship hesitates to mandate this result. If the Director of the Federal Register tells the 
SEC that it believes such a measure is necessary, the SEC can pass this on to FASB as a sympathetic 
goodwill ambassador rather than heavy-handed regulator. 
259. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ I l l , J l4, 1 15 ,  l l 8, J l 9  (2005) (establishing compulsory 
licensing arrangements for various contexts); id. § 801 (effective May 3 1 ,  2005) (prescribing par­
ticipation of these actors in administering such arrangements); see supra note 1 55 (discussing 
compulsory licensing). 
260. See PIERCE, supra note 207, at 226. 
26 1 .  Norms of publication and availability have assumed amplified importance i n  the digital 
age when dissemination of materials has become so much easier than historically was the case. See, 
e.g., Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1 996, Pub. L. No. 1 04-23 1 ,  §§ 3-22, 
1 10 Stat. 3049 ( 1 996). 
262. E.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2000). 
263. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 ( 1 984). 
264. Cf Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'!, Inc., 293 F.3d 79 1 ,  807, 8 1 7  n.59 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(en bane), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003) (citing Christopher M. v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 933 F.2d 1 285, 1 292 (5th Cir. 199 1 )). 
265. It may be tempting to attribute alteration of copyright to standards embodied in law primar­
ily to copyright doctrine and only secondarily to governmental action. Copyright law's merger doctrine 
negates copyright protection when an idea and its expression merge-without regard to why-and this 
could include embodiment in Jaw. See Pollack, supra note 202. While this analysis is credible, it essen­
tially ignores the undeniable fact that government action caused copyright's merger doctrine to trigger 
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amount to taking a relatively modest property interest. 266 After all, under 
copyright doctrine, the scope of protection provided to standards is thin, 
even before embodiment in law.267 
For such evaluations, the Director would follow existing procedures 
governing governmental takings, specifically those denominated as regula­
tory takings.268 Under existing law, administrative agencies are empowered 
to exercise judgment concerning takings rights, claims, and proceedings, 
subject to judicial oversight. In the proposed framework, the Director would 
require each agency to make such a determination but would also have de 
novo review over agency judgments. Similar to weak form cases, the Direc­
tor of the Federal Register would consult with the Librarian of Congress, the 
Copyright Office, and Copyright Royalty Judges in reaching determinations. 
Directorial decisions would remain subject to judicial review for adequacy 
and constitutionality, as under existing law.269 
In all cases, the Director also must address the question of derivative 
works. That is, can government or third parties freely revise standards em­
bodied in law, and subject them to copyright alteration, without the standard 
setter's permission?210 This latitude is an important factor in limiting copy­
right to standards embodied in law, as it facilitates producing standards of 
higher quality. Accordingly, it must be possible to permit this in appropriate 
circumstances. A standard setter's reasonable objections can be addressed 
by negotiation between it and the Director, bearing in mind the framework 
this Article contributes.211 Negotiations would occur when discussing other 
consequences, whether establishing terms of compulsory licensing arrange­
ments, evaluating the nature and measurement of takings, or considering the 
need and scope of any regulations mandating access. 
Modest legislative change would be necessary to create the administra­
tive scheme contemplated, principally assigning responsibilities and 
its vitiating effects. The relative causal weight of these factors likely varies with circumstances and 
participants would be entitled to negotiate over the issue. 
266. See supra Section l.D. 
267. See supra Section l.D. Analysis using the idea-expression distinction, for example, indi­
cates thin protection of standards because they tend to address ideas expressible in relatively few 
ways. See supra text accompanying notes 8 1 -84. Likewise, multiple prongs of the fair use doctrine 
point to an expansive scope of fair use, including the nature of standards as factual, the uses of them 
for training and compliance, and vying in the marketplace of ideas for embodiment in law. See 
supra text accompanying notes 85-88. Thin copyright protection can nevertheless be of consider­
able value. The key point is that measuring that value must account for the particular scope of 
protection at stake. 
268. See David A. Westbrook, Administrative Takings: A Realist Perspective on the Practice 
and Theory of Regulatory Takings Cases, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 7 1 7  ( 1999). 
269. E.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 ( 1 999); Yee 
v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 5 1 9  ( 1992); see generally Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'!, Inc., 
293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en bane), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003); BOCA, 628 F.2d 730, 732 
(I st Cir. 1980). 
270. See Karjala, supra note 83, at 502 n.255. 
27 1 .  Delineation and evaluation of all potentially relevant fact patterns potentially arising 
would require at least one entirely separate article, but the framework this Article contributes should 
be sufficient to define reasonable reference points for such negotiations. 
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defining the framework. First, the Federal Register Act would be amended 
to require the Director of the Federal Register to perform the proposed func­
tions, in consultation with the other designated bodies.272 Second, the 
Copyright Act would be amended to limit copyright's exclusive rights in 
accordance with the mandate so imposed on the Director, along lines con­
templated by this Article's three-part framework.273 Third, the Copyright Act 
would be amended to direct cooperation by the Librarian of Congress, the 
Copyright Office, and Copyright Royalty Judges with the Director of the 
Federal Register to enable satisfying statutory duties.274 
E. Loose Ends 
Potential implementation challenges this proposal faces are dwarfed by 
the public access and publication considerations that government's leverage 
strategy creates but previously has ignored or hidden from public view. 
Moreover, implementation challenges likely �ppear more substantial than 
they are. Several issues illustrate, suggesting a variety of loose ends rather 
than substantial hurdles. 
First, consider a standard setter's continuing rights to control use. That 
is, should a standard setter be required to accept a governmental embodi­
ment or have rights to withdraw standards to prevent embodiment? While 
this seems a difficult question conceptually, as a practical matter it should be 
272. New section 1 5 1 2  of the Federal Register Act, 44 U.S.C., could be added as follows: 
Section 1 5 1 2. Standards Embodied in law. The Director of the Federal Register shall review 
all standards proposed to be incorporated by reference for publication in the Federal Register 
to determine the effects of such embodiment in law on associated copyrights. The Director 
shall establish by regulation a framework for making such determinations having appropriate 
regard for the author, the work, those affected, and balancing the need for public access with 
the need to provide appropriate incentives for production under copyright law. In promulgating 
and carrying out such regulations, the Director shall consult with the Librarian of Congress, 
the Copyright Office and Copyright Royalty Judges to obtain expert guidance. 
Legislative history may refer to scholarly contributions such as this Article and other sources 
to guide governmental actors in fulfilling statutory duties. 
273. The Copyright Act's limitations on exclusive rights currently appear in 1 7  U.S.C. 
§ §  108-122, so a new § 123 could be added as follows: 
Section 123. Limitations on exclusive rights: Standards embodied in law. Notwithstanding any 
other provisions of this Title, (I)  no copyright shall be recognized in any standards embodied 
in law promulgated by or on behalf of the United States government or any agency or instru­
mentality thereof and (2) copyright to other standards embodied in law shall be limited in 
accordance with regulations promulgated by the Director of the Federal Register pursuant to 
44 u.s.c. § 1512 .  
274. The Copyright Act's directives covering these bodies in administering existing compul­
sory licensing arrangements appear in 1 7  U.S.C. § 801 (effective May 3 1 ,  2005), with cross­
references to the Copyright Act's sections imposing such arrangements (§§ 1 1 1 , 1 14, 1 1 5, 1 18 & 
1 1 9) (2000). So amendments would add a cross-reference to newly created § 1 23, supra note 273, 
and also provide as follows: 
Section 801 (as amended). Coordination with Director of the Federal Register. The Librarian 
of Congress, the Copyright Office and Copyright Royalty Judges shall provide expert guidance 
to the Director of the Federal Register to enable the Director to discharge statutory responsi­
bilities set forth in 44 U.S.C. § 1 5 1 2  as contemplated by § 123 of this Title. 
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of limited significance. Most organizations whose standards are embodied in 
law seek this result and should eagerly cooperate. For others, difficult re­
maining issues are no more acute than in the absence of institutional 
mechanisms to resolve them. 
Second, standards embodied in law do not necessarily remain embodied 
in law forever. A governmental authority may embody a standard in law at 
one time and later announce that meeting it is no longer legally required. 
This occurs, for example, when FASB promulgates an accounting standard 
that supercedes a previously applicable AIPCA standard.275 Such withdrawal 
should revive copyright in such works to the same extent that general prin­
ciples of copyright law provide. The justification for altering copyright is 
embodiment in law and the work's removal from embodiment justifies re­
versing the alteration. While so returning such works to copyright protection 
can pose intriguing complexities, the stakes as a practical matter should be 
low. The value of such a copyright would be near zero in all but the rare 
cases where some archival value endured. 
Third, classifying commentary accompanying standards embodied in 
law can present challenges. For example, FASB accounting standards 
adopted by majority vote sometimes include separate opinions from dissent­
ing members.276 The best way to think about associated copyright effects is 
by analogy to dissenting judicial opinions. These inform law's shape, even if 
they do not constitute law. So for reasons akin to those applicable to other 
legal materials, they are in the public domain. 
Fourth and finally, does embodiment in law of private standards render 
them law so that their interpretation involves the practice of law within the 
meaning of state regulation of lawyers? If so, then only lawyers qualified to 
practice in a given jurisdiction would be authorized to engage in this activ­
ity. In the case of accounting standards embodied in law, a tempting 
implication is that accounting becomes lawyering. Despite the temptation, 
boundaries clarify professional domains in this and numerous other con­
texts. Distinctions do not classify materials as legal or activities as the 
practice of law (this is to tilt at windmills) but denominate them as the au­
thorized or unauthorized practice of law. Accountants and others 
interpreting standards embodied in law are engaged in the authorized prac­
tice of law.277 Treating private standards embodied in public law according to 
this Article's analytical framework thus should not raise complex problems 
otherwise associated with non-lawyers engaging in the practice of law. 
275. See supra text accompanying note 1 39. 
276. See Wanda A. Wallace, Contrarians or Soothsayers, CPA J., Dec. 2001 (examining 145 
dissenting opinions from FASB standards expressed in its 28-year life and noting how these can be 
"extremely informative" and sometimes emerge years later as majority stances). 
277. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Out-of-State Attorney Fee Forfeiture, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1 1 9 1 ,  1 1 93-94 & n.25 ( 1 987). 
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CONCLUSION 
As a matter of national policy, Congress encourages governmental lev­
eraging of regulatory functions by embodying privately promulgated 
standards in public law, the executive branch amplifies the policy to include 
protecting copyright in such private standards, and administrative agencies 
dutifully fulfill these mandates. State and local governments follow suit. The 
few federal courts that have addressed the consequences of this widespread 
practice contribute limited guidance, in part because the judicial branch can 
respond only in ex post cases and controversies. 
Despite governmental ambitions, no one is accountable for evaluating 
issues of public access to such materials, which ultimately hinge on copy­
right law and pose subsidiary issues of administrative law. The case of 
accounting standards illustrates the many ways standards become embodied 
in law and resulting trade-offs. These illustrations-and the broader class of 
which they are part-show need to repose decisionmaking authority and 
accountability in governmental officials to make classification determina­
tions and administer related copyright consequences. This Article 
contributes a framework for evaluation and nominates designated officials to 
perform these increasingly critical functions.278 
278. Drafts of this Article bore the title: "Who Owns Accounting Standards?" The answer: 
they are part of the commons, mostly. Under the Article's analysis, no one owns copyrights to any 
PCAOB standard or any FASB standard applicable to public companies; the public owns a right to 
compel fair licensing of AICPA standards as well as an expansive scope of fair use. Easy answers to 
such questions are elusive. Cf Ghosh, supra note 30, at 655 (reporting the following aftermath of 
Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'!, Inc., 293 F.3d 791  (5th Cir. 2002) (en bane) (footnotes omitted): 
An illustration of the stakes is provided by the facts surrounding the case of Peter Veeck. In 
June 2002, visitors to the Regional Web site, a forum for discussing and sharing the local law 
of Northern Texas and Southern Oklahoma, were confronted with the question "Who Owns 
the Law?" in bold red lettering. In equally bold lettering, the Web site provided the answer: 
"YOU DO!" 
Not quite. The questions in the quotation and the draft's original title are richer rhetorically 
than analytically. No one owns law or accounting standards. Questions concern rights to control 
access, to copy and to improve law or standards derivatively. 
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